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A study and comparison of the duties and functions of the
lr.u officer and the Federal district jud^e; powers inherent
in the office of a Federal judge concerning which the Code and
Manual are silent 5 and extent to t/hich such powers inhere




Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
officers of the armed forces, engaged in military justice, had only
occasional need to be concerned with Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, Since the passage of the Code, these same officers have
been sporadically exposed to the federal Rulesj the U. S. Court of
Military Appeals and boards of review have occasionally alluded to
them.
The contents of this thesis have indicated that a law officer
has far broader powers than contemplated originally by military
officers and the framers of the Manual for Court s Martial. 1951 * and
that there are still areas in which the law officer may be even more
equated to a federal judge. Although this study is not all inclusive
due to the magnitude of the subject, law officers may be hereby
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The franers of the Uniform Code of Ailitary Justice told the
Congress during hearings that their intention was to make the law
officer before a general court-martial like the judge of a federal
court.* In enacting the Code, it uould seen that Congress intended
that he should serve like a judge, uherever possible, taking into
consideration the procedural differences "cetueen the t\;o systems.
The United States Court of Ailitary Appeals quickly recognised
the existence of the Congressional intent and, at an early date,
directed to it the attention of both law officers and those authori-
ties reviewing general courts-martial*-* There has resulted a steady
flow of decisions uhich have equated the lax; officer to the federal
judge in several instances. k This study uili be concerned with a
comparison of the pouers exercised by the judge of a federal district
court in criminal cases uith those of a law officer in a general
court-martial to note similarity, variance, and avenues through
which the law officer may find additional pouers.
1 Act of 5 Hay 1950, 64. Stat. 107 j 50 U.S.C. 551, codified by the
Armed Forces Act, 10 U.S.C. 801 et seq., hereafter referred to as the
Code or UC2-U
^ Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed__ Services.
House of Representatives, on U.",„ .2A9o , 31st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1153
(154-9)
United States v. Berrv. 1 USGM 235, 2 C1R 141 (1952)
U United States v. Keith. 1 USCi A 493, U GI-E 85 (1952)
United Stateg v. Jackson. 3 USCIIA 6^6, 14 C&B, 64- (1954-)
United States v. London. A 0SCMA 90, 15 CIR SO (1954-)
United States v. Strinrer . 5 USCI A 122, 17 C1R 122 (1954-)
United States v. Allbe«, 5 USCI "A AA8, IS CIS 72 (1955)
For a better understandinc of the tuo syster:s, the follouinc;
chapter vill be devoted to coLparin^ the (general covrt-nartial pro~
cedure uith that of a federal district court in crirdnal cases
CHAPTER II
coiParisoit or federal district court procedures liti: those or courts-
i-iiiRTIAL
GEI1ERAL Both the federal district court and the court-martial derive
their powers from the U. S. Constitution, but through different Arti-
cles. The U. S. Constitution authorizes the Congress to establish
courts inferior to the ouprerie Court,* pursuant to uhich, district
courts having been established. ° Although the U. S. Constitution
empowers the Congress to raise and support the arxied forces, ' their




u Consequently, a district court is part of the judicial branch
of the government, whereas a court-martial is administered through
the executive. Nevertheless, both dispense justice in criminal pro-
ceedings.
Since courts-martial serve in assisting the Executive Depart-
ment of the . Covernrent in maintaining discipline in the armed forces,
they are subject to certain limited administrative directives of the
superior authority appointing the court. As an example, courts-martial
are without authority to try a particular case unless the authority
appointing the court so directs. Te'deral courts, as a part of the
judiciary, have no system uhich is a counterpart. Notwithstanding
executive administration, there is a striking similarity between fed-
eral criminal procedures and those oi a court-martial. ,..
5 U. S. Const., Art. Ill, Sec. 1
6 1G U. 3. C. 3231
^
"-T
. S, Const., Art. I, 5ec. b, cl. 14.
8 U. S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 2
Poxrers of q federal district judge and pouors of a lav officer
or 3 closely corrected x/ith, and often dependent upon, procedural rules*
So for one uho is unfamiliar uith either the federau * criminal, or
general court-martial proceedings, there follows a brief revieu of
both for a better und?rstanding of material to be discussed later.
Special provisions, such as waiver of a certain procedure, for instance,
u
not be discussed for the purpose of simplicity.
FEDERAL DISTRICT COIHT Consider the defendant who is to appear
before a federal district judge in a jury trial* He nay be arrested
o io
either before or after indictment, Ii -arrested prior to indictment,
he is taken before a commissioner uhere he is warned that he does not
ha^e to make a statement, is given the opportunity tc be represented
by counsel, and granted a preliminary hearing to determine whether or
T
"J
no& there is probable cause for holding him* " If bhe determination
is in the affirmative, the commissioner sets the defendant free on
bail or commits him to jails ' The cou>-t refers the matter to a grand
jury which indicts the defendant* The case is then referred to 'the
district court. ' However, if the indictment precedes the defendant's
arrest, he nevertheless appears before the commissioner for cormit-
ment or to have bail set. -^ The defendant then appears before the
10
district judge for arraignment, at which time he is entitled to
9 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule I,
10 federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9H Federal Rules oi Criminal Procedure,, Rule 5
12 Tola.
13 Federal Rules oi Criminal Procedure, Rules 6 and 7H Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 6(f)
*5 Feaerrl Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9
16 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 10
U
counsel oi his o\n.± choice, or, in the absence ox the financial
ability to obtain counsel, he is entitled to have counsel appointee"
for him as a ratter of rigiit. At this time, notions are heard- °
he is arraigned, and he is called upon to plead to the indictment,*^
The judge then sets the date for hearing the case* At the trial, the
21jury is selected and sworn « The judge determines the merit of
challenges for cause The government presents its case followed by
that of the defendant <, The judge instructs the jury on the law of the
case, 22 after which the jury retires to consider its verdict. The jury
may find the defendant not guilty, guilty of the offense charged, or
23
guilty of a lesser offense included within the offense charged*
The verdict must be unan.ii.ious.; After the verdict, the judge may,
but is not required to, postpone sentence pending: receipt 6f a report
from the court's probation service concerning the defendant's back-
ground. The judge sentences the defendants
GEHBRIL C0I3RT»ilfiRTIi^ An accused* the military term applied
to a defendant, who is to appear before a general court-martial may
26
or may not be taken into custody; dependent upon the circumstances.
He may be placed in confinement if necessary to assure his presence
l'l Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 43
*" Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12
•*-° Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 10
20 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? Rule 11
2} Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24
2<: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30
23 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 31
25 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32
26
-.v-w 10, UCMJ
at the trial; or he may be retained in a status of arrest, strictly
a military term defined as a moral restraint to a certain limited
28
geographical area, violation of which would give rise to an additional
29
charge. Therefore, restriction of his movements is usually determined
30
by his commanding officer or superior authority. .Any person subject
to the Code, who has personal knowledge or who has made a preliminary




charges, a statement of the offense against the accused. An officer
is next appointed to investigate impartially the charges to determine
32
the truth of the matter set forth. The accused is entitled to be
present at the investigation, to be represented by counsel, to examine
witnesses, and to testify in his own behalf. The investigating officer's
report is referred to the superior who has authority to convene the
33general court-martial.. The file is reviewed by the staff judge ad-
vocate for the convening authority; the latter then refers the case to
34
trial before a court whose members are appointed by him. Contrary to
the federal procedure, all parties to the general court-martial trial,
i.e. law officer, court members, and counsel, must be sworn in the pre-
35
sence of the accused* The latter is entitled to counsel, either appoint-
or
.ed or of his choice. The members of the court, not the law officer,
27 Art. 13, UCMJ
28 Art, 10, UCMJ
29 Art. 9p, UCMJ
30 par. 22, MCM. 1951
31 Art. 30, UCMJ
32 Art. 32, UCMJ
33 Art a 33, UCMJ
34 Art. 34, UCMJ
35 Art. 42, UCMJ
36 Art. 27, UCMJ
37determine the merit of challenges for cause. The accused is
arraigned, 2k rations are heard, 9 and he is required to pleads The
prosecution presents its case followed by that of the accused, Frior
to considering the findings, the lau officer instructs the court on
the lau of the case. The members of the court, exclusive of the
12lau officer and counsel, determine the findings, * uhich may he either
quilty, not guilty, or guilty of an offense lesser included uithin
that charged*4-^ Lack of a requirenent that the finding be unanimous
prevents a hung court. It proceeds to hear data concerning the accused
which usually is available without the necessity of a postponement,44
The court members then determine the sentence ••>
COIP/RISCi: From the above, a similarity is quite apparent
between the federal and the military procedure; arrest by federal
officers—arrest 'crj the military'; commitment by a cci.missioner--™con-
finement by commanding officer; ind.ictment by grand jury—investigating
officer's report and staff judge advocate's advice; trial by jury-
trial by court-martial members; motions, arraignment, pleas, and trial
of issues are the same; instructions to the jury—instructions to the
court members; verdict—finding; evidence of defendant's record—evi-
dence of accused's record; sentenced by the judge—sentenced by the
court members.
37 Arts. 41, 51, 52, UCIU
3g par. 65, *:Cii, 1951
-/ par. 66 et sea,, iiGh, 1951
4° par. 70, IICL, 1951
41 ixt, 51, UCIU
42 /xt. 39, UG-I5
43 fxU 51, UCIU
44 par. 75, M&i, 1951
45 /xt. 39, UCIU
But a detailed analysis of the pouers of a federal Judge and
a lau officer uill shou even a greater similarity, Eue to the unre-
lated nature of the si:bjects to he covered they r.tust he grouped for
the purposes of clarity and continuity. Therefore, as used in
federal practice, they uill he considered in relation to pouers before
trial of the issues, pouers during the hearing on the issues, and




co:prison cf poiiERS exercised woke trial of thl issues
GEi^SR/Ii "The defendant, in a federal district court, appears
before the judge, on a set date, for his arraignment, to make any motions,
and to set forth his plea. Then, there usually follous the setting of
a later date for the selection of jurors cud trial of the general issues.
But, in the military, once the accused appears before the court, the
trial usually proceeds to finality, in the absence of any continuance
for cause. Consequently, the term "trial" in the federal court uould
seer, to mean that period coimencing uhen the court meets to begin "the
selection of jurors and trial of the issues;^ whereas in the military
the \:ord "trial" refers to the period commencing linen the court first
meets. In the military, contrary to the federal court, "trial" also
includes: the swearing of the lew officer, members of the court and
counsel; consideration of challenges; hearing of motions; arraignment;
and, pleas of the accused. Consequently, certain powers exercised by
the judge of the federal district court prior to trial, i.e. at the
arraignment, are exercised by the law officer during the trial in a
general court-r.artial.
TL'DFPJL J'lJDGii: The federal judge is appointed, suorn uhen he
assumes his office, and thenceforth serves in his official capacity.
He hears all cases brought before him. Prior to the trial on the
issues, he hears the arraignment, notions, and pleas.
& 53 ui, Jm-., Trial, Sec, A
47 lederal v,.ulos oi Criminal Procedure, .Rule 12
L A'.
,
LTTICER The law officer's existence depends upon his being
so appointed by a convening .authca?ity^° and lasts only lo long as
the order appointing the court remains in effect, Further, he cannot
act in a particular case until the appointing authority lias at least
referred it to the court of uhich he is law officer, . nd lastly, his
oath must be administered in each individual case in fie presence of
the accused,^ Failure to do so is reversible error,' Both the Code
and the 2 Manual are silent as to his acting as a law officer in a par-
ticular case prior to the initial meeting of the court to hear that
case, However, his limited power to act in any cour Wiarti al would
seen to preclude his performing any substantial duties prior to the
military trial itself. In this respect, the Manual, in discussing
defenses and objections, provides that those capable of determination
vjithout the trial of an issue raised by a plea of not guilty may be
submitted to the convening authority before trial or to the court
during trial • This provision, as expressed by the framers of the
manual, appears to substantiate the opinion that the lau officer is
relatively powerless to act prior to the court's first meeting; further,
he is not under oath, a specific act required in each trial. There
has been one notable case on the lai: officer's pouer before the court
meets.
In United States v, 1/j.llican . after the case had been referred
to the court for trial, a conference, purportedly in accordance uith
*8 /.rt 6 22, ;UC;£& Art. 42, t;c::j
50 ACII 5274-, Pino, 6 CMR 543
ACM 7342, Helch* 12 GI-JR b20
51 par. 67, iCIx, 1951
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Frccedure, Rule 12, was held in the
presence of the law offr.cer, both counsel, accused, and a reporter to
determine the admissibility of and admit into evidence certain docu-
ments. ^ The conference uas made a matter of record and defense
counsel at the time specifically approved the hearing The reviewing
court stcted that it neither approved nor disapproved the procedure
but that a hearing of this type should be held during the course of the
trial. The case uas affirmed since: (1) defense counsel e::pressly
approved the procedure, thereby not being in a position to complain
upon review; (2) the conference was mace a part of the record; (3)
there was no prejudice; and (40 any other action by the reviewing court
would be recognizing form over substance. It is believed that the
law officer actually exceeded the power granted by Rule 12, Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which only applr.es to motions; he nore
approximately applied Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
generally is not. used in crJLiinal cases. It is also believed that the
difference between the federal and the military meaning of "trial"
confused the law officer in this case- It would therefore appear
from the 1,'anual and this decision that a la7.; officer, before the court
actually first meets in a case, has practically no power, the affirmance
in the Ilullicon case being considered an exception in view of the
special procedure there employed. The outcome in the liullican case
does, however, suggest a useful procedure which might be considered
beneficial.
52 7 USCIi/i 200, 21 CI.R XJ/, (1956)
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This r.ethod would require a deviation fron the trial procedure
as outlined in the lianual*3^ /JLthough there is no provision for its
use, there also is nothing specifically prohibiting it. This gysten
would merely involve the court-r.artial initially meeting without the
court nenbers. Those present should, include all other parties, viz.,
the law officer, the trial counsel, the defense counsel, the accused,
and the reporter. The trial would then coi-aence as it does under the
present trial £uide« The reporter would he sworn, qualifications of
counsel would be considered, there would he an opportunity <-iven to
object to counsel and the law officer for cause, and the oath would
be administered to the law officer and counsel. Then the accused could
be arraigned and notions heard in accordance with Rule 12$ but taking
ETC
evidence on the merits, as in the ...ulliean case^ would be improper.
Lastly- the accused would be called upon to plead. Then the court
Berbers woiild assume their seats; there would follow an opportunity to
challenge the members and the administration of their oath. This method
merely rearranges the order of procedure now used and permits the
absence of the court members durinr preliminaries. It v;ould be useful
when lengthy motions are to be :.;ade, sometimes requiring that the law
officer continue the case for their proper consideration. As will be
seen when considering notions, the law officer would in some instances
have to present the factual issue raised by the ,..otion to the court
members for consideration, Curing the hearing on the notions and
durin^ their consiceration by the law o;r iicer, the court members serve
tir>
?J app. Ca, 1 102 1, 1C51
5A I ederal Rules of Cri: anal Procedure, Rule 12
^ 5 United States v. I/uliicoxi . 7 -J3CI," 20G, 21 CIS 33.', (1956)
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no useful purpose j in fuct they may have a tendency to become irri-
table IT arguments and delays are lengthy* It night be said that the
Challenge of the lau officer cr counsel for cause so as to require
a recess would defeat this procedures but no more so than as now
under a similar challenge when the full court is present.
Certainly'- the Code does not prohibit this practice, and it
would then be in conformance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Fro-
cedure, uhich, the Code states, JO should be followed wherever possible.
But following the federal practice might be considered as doing too
much violence to the present Lanual. The current trial guide is
practically the same as that found in the iarmy x.anuel for Courts-Lartial,
57
1949, uhich in turn is nearly the same as the 192& i anual. <-nd when
the present I anual was written, the franers did not have the numerous
decisions of the Court of Military /appeals to follow regarding the
role of the newly created lax; officers previously he had been a court
member. Undoubtedly the I'anual could be changed to so provide for this
method of commencing the trial*
iiOTICUS
General . Special pleas and motions in federal and military
courts have been abolished through the Federal Rules of Criminal
eg 5°
Procedure" and the I -anual respectively, resulting in there now being
only a motion for appropriate relief and, a motion to dismiss. In the
federal court, motions must be made in writing unless the Judge permits
56 IxU 36, UCI.J
57 a Lanual for Courts- Hartir.l, U*5* /xmy, 192S
5t- 1 ederal Utiles of Criminal Frocedure, Rule 12
59 par. 66, I'd ., 1951
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them to be made orally." The Code is silent as to such a requirement,
but the hernial states they nay he made orally or in writing in a
military courto Invariably, the law officer hears motions orally
«
hotions in the federal court . /. motion for appropriate relief
may be used to raise defenses and objections based upon defects which
occurred while instituting the prosecutionj they must be made before
the plea is entered* ^ However, the court in its discretion may per-
mit the making of a motion for appropriate relief a reasonable time
after the plea, * Examples of this type of motions are those predi-
cated upon faulty grand jury proceedings and defects in the indict-
ment or information ether than lack of jurisdiction cr the failure to
state an offense. ^ But the court may refuse to grant the motion if
not timely made, eg. where the motion relates to a joinder of counts
in the indictment ** or indefiniteness of the indictment as to quantity
66
and value.
motions to dismiss, in contrast with motions for appropriate
relief, need not be made before the plea is entered ' and are not waived
if delayed until the trial a*" Proper grounds for this type of motion
are lack of jixeisdiction, failure cf the indictment to state an offense,
former jeopardy, the statute of limitations, and immunity.. There is
60 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4.7
61 par. 67c, mCI-i, 1951
°2 Federal Roles of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12 (b) (2)
^3 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12 (b) (3)
64 Cyc, Fed. Froc, Sec, 42,176
6p Smith Vc United .States, ISO F.2d 775 (D, C* Cir«. , 1950)
j}£ United States v. Kickerson, 211 F. 2d 909 (7th Car., 1954.)
6? Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12 (b) (1)
oS cyc, Fed. Proc, Sec, 42,165
^9 Cyc. Fed* Froc, Sec, 4-2„l66
H
even authority that the statute of linitations should be raised before
70
trial unless relief is granted by the court to raise it later. it
is too late to raise it for the first tine uhen -nuking a notion to
71
vacate sentence.
i lotions are heard and decided usually before trial, but in
appropriate cases the judge nay defer his decision until there has
been a hearing on the general issues. "* However, issues of fact in
connection with defenses and objections shall be tried by a jury if
a jury trial is required under the Constitution or an Act of Congress/ ->
Tactual issues connected with the statute of limitations and forner
jeopardy are examples of situations where this provision applies."*
Options, in
_
the military . The Fanual similarly allows notions
75for appropriate relief and for dismissal as in the federal procedure;
the provisions are patterned after Rule 12, Federal Rules of Criminal
7o
Procedure. The Manual provides that any notion for appropriate
relief predicated upon the faulty institution of court-martial pro-
77
ceedings must be made before the plea is entered, or it is waived."
However, as in the federal court, the leu officer has discretion in
granting relief from the waiver.' Also, similar to the federal
court, notions to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction, failure
of the specification to state an offense, double jeopardy, and the
statute of limitations, nay be raised before the plea, but they are
70 United States v, Tnylor, 207 F„ 2d 437 (7th Cir., 1953)
' 2 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12 (b) (4)
73 J&ia,
'4 C. J. 3., Criminal Law, oec, 1132
C. J. S., Criminal Lav, Sec, 1129
75 par. 66, FCIl, 1951
7£l Legal and Legislative Basis, "£11, 1951, p. &2




not waived if the rotion is de3ayed until later in the trial,
Motions ere heard during the trial but before the pies is entered?
however, the law officer may defer his ruling on notions relating to
defences or objections until a later tine. The hanunl provides
81
that a decision on a notion is an interlocutory natter. It goes
on to state that if the notion raises a contested issue of fact which
should properly be considered by the court in determining the guilt
or innocence of the accused, receipt of evidence nay be deferred
until evidence on the general issue is introduced. ' This last pro-
vision was inserted in the I.anwai due to the contents of Rule 12 (b) (4-),
To be specifically noted, because of later discussion, is the language
used in Rule 12 (b) (4.) which states, i7A : lotion before trial raising
defenses or objections shall be determined before trial unless the court
orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial of the general
issue. I:n issue of fact shall be tried by a jury if a jury trial is
required under the Constitution or an; >ct •of Congress", and the lan-
guage in the I Manual which states,
"i notion raising a defense or objection will be determined
at the tine it is made unless the court defers action on
the notion until a later time...* If' the notion raises a
contested issue of fact which should properly be considered
by the court in connection with its determination of the
accused* s guilt or innocence , the introduction of evidence
thereon nay be deferred • *• :!
°*
79 par. 67a., 12011, 1951
|0 par, 67e., hCh. 1951
f- Ibid.
33 federal Rules oi Criminal Procedure, Rule 12 (b)(4)
84 Ibid.
s5 pGro 67e., 'Cm, 1951
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Ifoited JJtata3 v 6 jCinielan uas the first case to consider issues
£6
of fact on a notion which had to be decided by the court .. e: oers.
The accused had nade a notion to dicniss the case due to lack of jur-
isdiction. Evidence showed that the arrr.ed service concerned possessed
records showing that Crnelas had absented hinself , uhereas he hii>-
self testified to facts tending to show that he had not been actually
inducted. The lav officer overruled the notion. At the conclusion
of the trial, the defense requested that the factual issue of whether
or not the accused was a member of the . service be subnitted to the
court. The request uas denied. The U. 3, Court of military Appeals
held that the lau officer erred in resolving the issue of fact. He
should have submitted it to the court i.ienbers under appropriate in-
struction. The U. S. Court of iiilitary Appeals noted that the
i'anual provides, "A decision on such a notion is an interlocutory
natter", ' and distinguished it fro:': interlocutory ouestions uhich are
finally decided by the lau officer in accordance uith the Code."
Further, the opinion quoted the sentence in the manual concerning the




^ Then in the very no:rt sentence of the opinion
the court stated, " «•« there nay be issues of fact involved in a
^£^£§LJ^^it^^i^ which should be dealt uith by nenbers of the
court." (Underscoring supplied) Thus it appeal's that the court used
interchangeably the //uiXt or p nnocence i'anual language and the
86 2 USCSiA 96, 6 Cm 96 (1952)
87 par. 67e„, nCIi* 1951
S8 /art. 51(b), UC: ;J
B9 par, 67e„, IlCXi, 1951
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defense or obj action language in Rule 12(b) (4-) • It is believed that
there is a distinct difference betueen the tuo, since a fact pertain-
ing to a defence or objection does not necessarily relate to guilt
or innocence. The Court also concluded that uncontested issues of
fact need not be ' submitted to the court, and the lau officer can rule
finally on the lau involved in such a motion,. Finally to be noted,
because of the comparison of this case with the language contained in
others, is the fact that the opinion was written by Chief Judge 'uinn,
90
The next case, United States, v. ^.cheill , also involved a
jurisdictional question. Tlie opinion, written by Jadge Latimer, con-
cluded that the accused as. a natter of lau was a ? m her of the service,
thereby precluding the need for the lau officer submitting any factual
issue to the court members* However, the opinion, while referring to
the Orhelas case, stated, ,? ... we held that if there was a factual
dispute concerning jurisdiction which would have an effect on the
ultimate r-uilt or, innocence of the accused, it should be presented to
the court-martial for determination. H (underscoring supplied)
on
There followed the case of United States, v. .lohnson,^ the opin-
ion for which was written by the late Judge Brosnan* The court finally
concluded that the accused was a member of the service as a matter of
lau. Cf more particular interest is the language, " ... despite a de-
fense request, no instruction uas supplied the members of the court
advising then that they must first find that the accused had been a
member of that Armed Service before they might lawfully find him guilty
$0 2 USCEHA 3Z3» 9 CITi 13 (1953)
91 6 USCj: 320, 20 C1T? 36 (1955}
IS
of having deserted it." It is believed that this statement leans to-
v;ard the ^.ilt or innocence concept.
92
Finally, in United States v. Berry,, again written by Chief
Judre rtiirn, it uas stated, while a^ain referring to the Crnelas case,
,J
... we uere concerned with disputed questions of fact
re^ardin^ a matter which would bar or be a complete de-
fense to the prosecution. m matter of that kind should
•properly be considered by the court in connection with its
determination of the accused *s cuilt or innocence. 1
hanual for Courts- i artial, United States, 1951, paragraph
67e.
"
The language in the Berry opinion of course reverts to the defenses
or objections concept as to when the court members decide issues of
fact, as compared with the theory that factual issues recording a
motion are only roxerred to the court when the facts relate to
fuilt or innocence*
Proa the fore^oin^ cases, it appears that the Crnelas and
Berry opinions '3 support the theor; that any factuel issue raised by
a motion to dieniss relates to a defense or objection in bar of trial
and therefore should be sub .itted to the court : embers for deter:/dilation.
Jut the lan£uaje in the ,-ceill and Johnson cases ' appears to limit
such factual issues to those which only relate to the guilt or inr.o-
cunce of the accused. It is to he noted, however 5 that this rule of
law as to factual issues connected with lotions was established and
affirmed in jurisdictional cases involving desertion. In other words,
these cases concerned the accused teinc unable to desert the service
S2 6 USC1-1A 609, 20 CI R 325 (1956)
93 United States v. tonelas^ 2 USCiiA 96, 6 CI R 96 (1952)
United, States v. 3err£, 6 USCl A 609, 20 CiR 325 (1956)% United States v. IksITeill . 2 USCIIA 3^3, 9 CIJl 13 (1953)
United States v. Johnson. 6 USC-A 320, 20 C1P. 36 (1955)
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if he was not a reenter thereof. Consequently, a determination of the
issue as to whether or not the accused- was a member of the service
had a direct bearing on whether or not he could he found, guilty of
deserting tho said service. Thus, in result, there is no conflict
among these cases between the ^uilt or innocence concept and the
defense or objection concept when determining whether or not a factual
issue should be submitted to the court members.
Digressing slightly iron the foregoinc cases, had the juris-
dictional factual issue been raised on a notion to dismiss in a
robbery case or in the trial of a civilian overseas, nay there be a
different result. In a trial on a robbery charge, the accused
might contend that he was not a member of the service, 13.though jur-
isdictional, this type of an offense is different from desertion,
which is solely military in nature. It requires military membership
before it may be committed. Similarly, a civilian accompanying the
armed forces overseas nay raise the question of 'jurisdiction when
charged with a civilian criminal offense as distinguished from one
which is strictly military. The question, of course, is whether or
not a contested factual issue in these instances should be referred
to the court members when considering a motion to dismiss based upon
lack of jurisdiction.
Digressing further, suppose the motion to dismiss is based upon
the statute of limitations or double jeopardy 3 then would it be
necessary to submit a contested issue of fact to the court for its
determination. Both of these operate strictly as a bar to trial rather
than having any bearing on jailt or innocence,
20
As stated in the Craelas. case.,- ** paragraph 67, I Cm, 1951,
dealing with notions was patterned after Rule 12(b), Federal Pules
of Criminal Procedure*' Subparacraph 4- of the latter, previously
quoted in part, states that issues of fact when considering defenses
and objections shall be referred to a jury if a jury trial is required
under the Constitution or an Act of Congress. Paragraph 67e., iXI-i,
1951, follows Rule 12(b) j I ederal Rules of Criminal Procedure in its
language* The Fanual cites an example where it would be appropriate
for the law officer to defer his ruling on a notion involving the
statute of limitations j it involves a defense contention that the
offense was committed earlier than alleged so as to be barred. This
example is one situation which is rather obvious, but it does demon-
strate that passing to the court r.enbers certain issues of fact in
connection with motions was contemplated by the Trailers of the IJanuaU
The extent to which they intended to submit issues of fact remains
in doubt | it can only be interpreted from its language and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
To give credence only to the ,< uilt or innocence concept, i.e.
the factual issue must relate to the guilt or innocence of the accused
before it is submitted to the court members for consideration, would
in effect reject the statement contained on page b2 in the Legal and
Legislative asis, 1X11., 1951* to the effect that paragraph 67, £P,
1951, was patterned after Rule 12 (b), Federal Rules of Criminal Frc-
cedure. In order to follow the Code's provision for making military
95 United States v. Ornelas . 2 USCIiil 96, 6 CIR 96 (1952)
96 Legal and Legislative Basis, FCF, 195I> p. ^2
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court rules similar where possible to those in the federal district
en
courts, to be consistent with tiie passage in the Legal ana Legisla-
tive Sasis, MCii, 1951, and to adhere to Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of
Criminal FrocediTe, it is believed that the language of Judge ruinn
Oii
in the Berry case'' aptly announces the proper rule so as to reconcile
the above provisions* To repeat, he stated while discussing the Cr-
r.elas case,>9
" «., we uere concerned with disputed questions of fact
regarding a matter which would bar or be a coL.plete de-
fense to the prosecution* A matter of that kind should
'properly be considered by the court in connection with
its determination of the accvised's guilt or innocence.
'
• • •
It is believed that naking any other determination in this field would
be tantamount to giving a law officer greater power in deciding a
factual issue on a motion than that apparently possessed by a
federal judge $ it is doubtful that anyone would oontend that Congress
or the framers of the I.anual so intended.
There does, hox;ever, remain another question to be decided.
It results from the statement of Chief Judge Quinn in the Crnelas
ICO
case when he stated, " ... we should add that it matters not, in
our opinion, t;bether the issue is submitted (to the court neubers)
at the tine the motion is made or at the conclusion of the case when
the court is required to deliberate on the evidence.'- On deciding a
motion, the i.anual provides that the accused has the burden of
97 Art. 36, UCi J
98 6 USCi;A 60?, 20 Clll 325 (1956)
99 United States v. Ornelas. 2 -USCIi/^96, 6 CR 96 (1952)
100 IbidL
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supporting it by a preponderance of evidence. -1 But where the statute
of limitations is involved there is an exception; it occurs where the
prosecution wishes to show the absence of the accused from the terri-
tory or some other impediment stopped the running of the statute.
In such an event, the prosecution has the burden of showing by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that the statute was tolled during a portion
of the period* Further, the Code provides that questions of this
type are decided by a majority vote, a tie vote being determined in
favor of the accused.-^ Therefore, assuming that the court members
were to vote on an issue of fact at the time a motion is made, the
accused would have the burden of supporting his motion by a prepon-
derance of evidence and must secure at least a tie vote. Turning to
the situation where the court members would decide the factual issue
while deliberating on the evidence, it might be possible to divorce the
factual issue from the guilt or innocence so as to use the Manual pro-
visions regarding the burden of proof and the number of votes required.
It would seem more logical, however, to have those issues determined
under the same rules as those applicable to guilt or innocence, namely,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution and at least a two-
thirds majority vote against the accused. Therefore, there exists a
clear difference as to when the issue is submitted to the court members,
and the question has not been as yet answered.
In view of the very unsettled law in this area, some conclu-
sions are here drawn for guidance until future decisions clarify the
status of factual issues on motions. Initially, the law officer must
101 par. 67e., MCM, 1951
102 par. 68c, kCM, 1951
103 Art. 52(c), UGMJ
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determine if there are any contested issues of Tact; if not, the law
officer Day rule finally on the notion, either at the tir.ie it is made
or later in the trial if he desires to defer his ruling, 'here there
is a contested issue of fact concerning any notion which would operate
as a bar to trial s such issue must be referred to the court members
for determination, :'.s to when the issue should be submitted to the
court, it vould appear safer, from the viewpoint of preventing the law
officer being overruled upon review, for bin to do so under appro-
priate instructions when the court deliberates upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused, future decisions may eventually clarify
this latter pojnt as to when in relation to the trial the court
should resolve the factual issue, Tnfrequency of its occurrence
can result in there not being a complete answer for quite some time*
In any" event, it is believed that the law officer's power in this
field Will ultimately be. considered equivalent to that of a federal
judge.
DISCOVERY ;.Ig_ EJSF^TTCk The judge may order the district
attorney, if he grants the motion, to show tangible objects to the de-
fendant's counsel so that photographs or copies mc; be made. 4 This
rule does not have a military counterpart nor its use employed, since
the government prior to trial is required to make available the names
of witnesses and to provide the accused with a copy of the statements
obtained by the investigating officer. -* There has not been any
determination by the U„ S, Court of Military /ppeals whether or not
1°4 Federal Rules of Criminal ProcediTe, Iftile 16
105 par. 33i (2), lXSLi9 1951
7U
this rule is applicable In a court-martial, iin Anay Eoard of Review
discussed it while reviewing the Batchelor case. It decided that
the rule was not. there applicable because of the failure to meet the
rule*s requirements, viz, (1) tangible objects. (2) which belonged
to the accused or uere obtained from hin or fron others by seizure
or process, (3) material to the preparation of the defense, and (4)
that the request was reasonable « The Eoarcl's opinion left the
impression, however, that such a motion was proper before a military
court when the defense wishes to see additional material in the posses-
sion of trial counsel, provided the proper foundation is laid, /d-
though discovery and inspection nay be in the nature of a motion
for appropriate relief, it is believed to be somewhat different and
within the power of the law officer to grant,
3EVER/iITCE, OF DLrsi :D^:T3 In a federal court a defendant may
10 rv
request a severance of his case from that of his co-defendants,
10°
and the decision rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge.
In the absence of any conflict of interest among the defendants, it
is sufficient if they are represented cry as many attorneys as there
110
Cu. e defendants." The power of the law officer in grantin.
severance of accused in a general court-martial is the same.*" The
party making the motion must show good cause, and, if not granted,
has the burden of showing on review that there uas a clear abuse of
106 Cm 377S32, Satchelor. 19 C1E 452, affirmed but not discussed,
UB^ed-Strtes v. 2atchelor, 7 USCIL/i 354, 22C1R 144- (1956)
lOTfederal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16
•lOo federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 14
109 Cpner v. Halted States, 34- 7 ;. S, 84 (1954)
110 Lebron v. united States. 229 I .2d 16 (D.C. Cir., 1955) cert,
den., 351 U. S. 974
111 par. 69d., IICK, 1951
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discretion by the lau officer."" The r.ere fact that a pre-trial
statement of one co-accused implicates another does not require se-
verance since proper instructions by the lev officer provide adequate
11^
safeguards against prejudice to the co-accused, ' Tailure of the
accused to request r. severance in an improper joinder constitutes a
waiver in the absence of a showing on review that there './as a manifest
aiscarriage of justice* '" Thus, the federal court and the nilitary
court are closely aliened on this subject.
DEFO^ITIorr.,. In a federal crininal proceeding depositions zaay
only be ordered taken and used upon the defendants notion, ^ whereas
in the military they nay also be used by the prosecution. ° The
notion in a federal court nay be nade any tine after the filing of an
indictnent or infornation, and its being granted is discretionary
117
with the trial judge, In the nilitary, depositions nay be taken
after charges have been preferred tut before court proceedings
connencej they nay also be taken while the trial is in progress. '
The lanual provides for the law officer, after trial begins, approving
the taking of a deposition but requires his referring the natter to
the convening authority if he deens the deposition should be forbidden
11°for good cause. J flthough there are a paucity of decisions pertain-
ing to the law officer's ruling on the taking of depositions, it
112 United States v. jfeans^ 1 JSC:g, 541, 4 CIS 13.? (1952)
113 jfajtod States v. Horner, 3 USCSLft 306, 12 GIR 62 (1953)
1L
; United States v. Podenheiner . 2 USC&La 130, 7 Ci.R 6 (1953)
115 federal Pules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 15 -
116 Art. 4.9, uerj
117 IfeflirL-V. 'United 3tatea
ff
223 3 .2d 371 (5th Cir., 1955)Ho Art. 49, UCI
J
119 par. 117b., I'Cl.., 1951
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probably is due to their beinc invariably taken before the cornence-
nient of court-r.artial proceedings. An Air Force Poard of Review
has held it to be prejudicial error for the lau officer to refuse a
continuance to take depositions, since the accused had shorn l00^
120
cause., But the U. 3, Court of military Appeals has held that the
lav; officer did not abuse his discretion by refusing; to allow the
taking of further depositions froi. a witness who had already*- deposed
where further depositions uould only endeavor to have the deponent
"i 21
change his answers. -" Neither case discussed the lau officer's
failure to refer his denial to the convening authority in accordance
uith the i.ianual» • This uould lead to the conclusion that the Jaw
officer 1 s ruling on the natter nay be final regardless of the Manual
provision. Certainly it uould be in consonance uith the U« &« Court
of .dlitary Appeals 1 expression of the lau officer's independence as
set forth in the Inudson crse.-^-' If so, the lau officer's pouer,




SSARC'l APD SK i:?J?£ . Personal property, stolen or embezzled in
violation of U, S, lau, or designee', and intended for use or has been
used as a : Leans for co:.i.:ittin{_; a criminal act, nay be seized by
order of the jud^e of a federal courts It is his duty to issue the
warrant if he is satisfied that srounds for the application exist or
12° /_c_ 6189, Lineberrv, g CI ft 767
121 United states v. Parrish. 7 USGuA 357, 22 CM: 127 (1956)
122 par. H.7K, 'Jk , 1951
123 Ijnited States v. jmudson, L, U&GI/i 5C7, 16 K3R 161 (1954)
124 Federal Pules of Crininal Procedure, Pule 41(b)
Z
lor
there is probable cause to believe that they exist.x ';'-> His deternina-
tion to issue the warrant is conclusive unless there is a chowin^ that
, , . ^ 126he acted arbitrarily or erroneously exercised his power.
In the civilian coranunity search warrants are used to seize
unlawfully possessed property which seizure would itself be unlauful
because of Constitutional protection against unreasonable seizures,
x '
whereas searches in the military Bay be ordered by the coijuendinc
12a
officer, a pouer dee:ied inherent in his authority to con .and, * In
the military there is no reference either in the Code or the .anual
regarding the law officer havin- any power whatsoever similar to
search and seizure under Rule 4.1(b)/'''"'' Such authority nay be delegated
"1 30
to others within his command. But the power to order a search ex-
tends only to military areas j a search warrant is necessary off the
post or station even though government property is being sought.
There is no decision regarding a law officer ordering a search
as a federal .judge may. Possibly, a lav; officer may receive by motion
during trial a request for a search and order it be made under Rule 41 (b'
Such order could be construed as lawful based upon the Congressional
13<
intent to equate the law officer to a federal judge wherever possible.
However, military cormand problems may result when the person conducting
the search ordered by a law officer passes from the area of one senior
125 United States v. Stewart, 79 F, Supp, 313 (E.D. Pa., 1948)
126 Dixon v ...United., States
,
211 F.2d 547 (5th Cir., 195-4)
127 U. S. Const., .Amend. IV
123 par. 152, 14CI1, 1951
129 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(b)
130 Ibid .
131 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(b)
132 Hearings bei'ore .a Subcommittee, of_the_ Committee on. Armed Forces,
House of Representatives on H.R
|
._249S. olst Cong., 1st Sess,,p«1153 (194^
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officer in command to search an area under the control of another
senior officer. There also would be the question of the legality of
a search ordered by a law officer in a command other than that of the
convening authority. This may sound unusual, but command authority
and general court-martial authority are not necessarily parallel. Ex-
pressed otherwise, a command having general court-martial jurisdic-
tion over a subordinate installation does not necessarily exercise
command control over that installation. Thus, it is concluded, from
a practical viev.point, a lav; officer, faced with a request for a
search, particularly outside the convening authority *s command, would
be more astute in directing that the trial counsel contact the conven-
ing authority to arrange at command level for the search. This con-
clusion is reached notwithstanding the possibility that the law officer
could administratively be authorised by the convening authority to
order searches in accordance with Rule 41(b), and that the lav/
officer may, and probably does, have an inherent power of his own to
order a search within at least the command of the convening authority.
i^POS^I^S A subpoena may be issued by a federal court compel-
135
ling the attendance of a witness. However, defense witnesses will
only be subpoenaed after the filing of an affidavit showing that the
testimony will be material, that the defendant cannot go safely to
trial without the witnesses 1 testimony and that the defendant is unable
136to pay the v-zitnesses 1 expenses. J
133 par. 152, MCfc, 1951
134- Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(b)
135 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17
136 Ibid.
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But in the military, defense counsel has an equal opportunity
137
to have a witness subpoenaed with that of the prosecution. The
138
trial counsel subpoenas witnesses. ' Defense counsel, where there is
disagreement with the trial counsel concerning the need for a witness,
must submit in writing a synopsis of the testimony expected from the
witness, full reasons which' necessitate personal appearance, and any
other matter showing the ejected testimony is necessary to the ends
of justice. ' The matter is referred before trial to the convening
authority, but if the controversy arises after the court convenes,
140
the decision is made by the law officer. This procedure in the
Manual lends support to the concept that the law officer's power does




VENUE, The location of a federal criminal trial is normally
14.2
the district or division x;here the offense occurred. The defendant
is entitled to his trial talcing place where the offense was commited
...... 143
as a matter of right under the U. S, Constitution and the Federal
144
Rules of Criminal Procedure; but if the court, upon the defendant's
motion, is satisfied that there exists in the district or division
where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the de-
fendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial, the judge
137 Art. 46, UCMJ
138 par. 115d., IBM, 1951
139 par. 115a., IICM, 1951
140 Ibid*
141 United States v . Ifoudson . 4 USCKA 587, 16 C1IR 161 (1954/
142 Federal Rules of 'Criminal Procedure, Rule 18
143 lT . S. Const., Amend. VI
144 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 18
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may grant a motion for appropriate relief to change the place of trial
to another district or division. *^ The trial court, in deciding the
14.6
motion, is vested with considerable discretion. For instance, the
motion should be granted where publicity is intense at the time the
jury is to be impaneled so as to create a hostile climate, resulting
in the assumption that the defendant would not receive a fair and
147
impartial trial.
In the military, neither the Code nor the Manual refer to chang-
ing the place of trial because of prejudice. However, in United States
1/ 8
v. Gravitt, the U. S. Court of Military .appeals recognized a motion
for appropriate relief would be proper to change the place of trial
if the accused could demonstrate that he would be adversely influenced
by a general atmosphere of hostility or partiality against him Mili-
tary cases do not specifically discuss the discretionary feature j by
implication it would appear that the federal rule would be followed,
viz., subject to reversal only where the discretion is abused. ^
.Also undecided is the finality of the law officer's ruling if
he were to grant the motion. According to the Manual, the convening
authority, if he disagrees with a ruling by the court, may return the
case to the court with an eicplanation of his reason for disagreement
and direct a reconsideration of the ruling. It further states that
the court may exercise its own discretion in reconsidering when the
145 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 21
146 Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir., 1955) cert, den.,
349 U.S. 915-
147 United^ States v. Florio , 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D. U.Y., 1952)
148 5 DSCMA 249, 17 CMR 249 (1954)
149 ACM 8609, Brossman, 16 CMR 721, pet. rev. den., 16 CMR 292
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150
disagreement only involves issues of fact, which is the case when
change of venue is concerned. It is therefore concluded that the law
officer's ruling should he final, subject only to his reconsideration.
In this respect his ruling should he similar to the finality of his
151
ruling on continuances.
BILL. OF P&RTICUL.ARS . Such a bill may be requested for cause in
152
a federal court. It cannot be used to disclose in detail the prose-
cution's evidence but is employed to define more specifically the of -
15°
fense charged, !!hether or not it will be allowed rests in the
154
sound discretion of the trial judge. ' • If the indictment, is definite
enough to prevent double jeopardy and allow the defendant to prepare
his case, it is considered sufficient and the request will not be
155
granted. .' In the military, the Code is silent, but the Manual pro-
156
vides for motions to grant appropriate relief, ' which, under proper
circumstances, may be equated to a request for a bill of particulars.
The Manual provides that the court should proceed if the accused is not
157
in fact :misled. It further provides that the court, in other words
the law officer:, may direct the specification be stricken and disregard-
ed, grant a continuance pending application to the convening authority
for directions, or permit the specification to be amended so as to
15&
cure the defect.
150 par. 67f., MCM, 1951
•151 United.JStates v, Knudson, 4 USCMA 537, 16 CMR- 161 (1954)
152 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7
153 Cefalu v. United States. 234 F.2d 522 (10th Cir., 1956) 350 U.S.<
154 Reynolds v. United States, 225 F.2d 123 (5th Cir., 1955)cert. den.^
155 Sawyer v. United,, States. 89 F.2d 139 (8th Cir., 1937)
156 par. 69, MCM. 1951
157 par. 69b (2), MCM 1951
158 par. 69b (3), MCM, 1951
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Although a bill of particulars is not specifically recognized
in a military court, the same result is reached through a motion for
appropriate relief. And a motion to make a specification more definite
rests in the discretion of the law officer whose determination will
159
not be disturbed unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Thus, the net result of the power exercised by the trial judge and the
law officer in this field is the same.
SUPPRESSION AND RETURN OF E.yiZ3E}JCE « Illegally obtained evidence
160
may be suppressed by motion in a federal court. The motion may be
made in the district where seized or in the district where the trial
161
is to be held. The burden is on the defendant to sustain the motion
by showing that the seizure was unconstitutional. ' If proper, the
trial judge will grant the motion after a hearing, or he may postpone
163his decision until the trial. The purpose of the Rule is to pre-
vent the delay of the trial for the determination of a collateral
164
issue a
In the military, such a motion would run squarely into the pro-
vision of the Manual which states that, "Military courts have no authority
to order a return to the accused of illegally seized property, or to
impound such property for the purpose of suppressing its possible use
^65
as evidence ... ", the theory being that there is ample opportunity
159 ACM 8609, Erossman, 16 Cl-JR 721, pet. rev. den., 16 CMR 292
160 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41
161 Ibid
.
162 On_Lee v. United_3tates, 343 U. S. 747 (1952)
163 United States"~v.~Leiser, 16 F.R.D. 199 (D.C. Mass., 1954)
164 UnitgdJ5t.at.es v. Gatewood, 109 Fed. Supp. 440 (D. C. 1953), re-
versed other grounds,,.209 F.2d 789
165 par. 152, MCM, 1951
to object to the evidence when it is offered. Notwithstanding, there
would seem to be a place for the Rule
° 3 in the military in order to
divorce and decide a collateral matter before trial of the issues, there-
by simplifying the procedure of the trial itself. This would be parti-
cularly true if the military were to adopt the federal pre-trial
concept of disposing of co?-iateral matters before the jury is im-
panelled. In addition to the above announced reason for the Rule, the
defense may wish to use the tactic of removing from any consideration
during the trial certain material that has been illegally seized.
There are no military precedents among reported cases, probably
because of the Manual provision. Any future military case in which
the motion for suppression is granted will not offer an opportunity
for a final decision on review; and it may require a particular case
where there is such gross prejudice by not granting a motion to sup-
press that a review will be allowed. Except for the Manual provi-
sion, there would appear to be no reason why such a motion could not
be permitted and thereby align the law officer's power in this field
with that of the federal judge insofar as suppression is concerned;
it should not, however, extend to returning the property to the
accused because it is believed the law officer lacks authority to
decide property rights.
This concludes a comparison of the law officer's powers with
those 'exercised by a federal judge before trial. Next will be con-
sidered and compared those powers the judge exercises during trial.
166 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41
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CHAPTER IV
C0M>ARIS01! OF TRIAL POWERS
Powers considered in this chapter usually occur during the fed-
eral procedure concept of a trial. In a general court-martial they
may occur during the trial of the issues or "before.
FAIR TRIAL. Both the judge and the law officer are required
to see that a person has a fair trial. In a federal court the judge
167
has the power and the duty to control and direct the trial ; he must
168
safeguard the rights of all the parties before it; he must be im-
169
partial both toward the defendant and the government; and he is




"' In comparison, the law officer, according to the
Manual, is responsible for the fair and orderly conduct of the pro-
171
ceedings. In commenting on evidence, his remarks should not extend
beyond an accurate, fair, and dispassionate statement of what the evi-
dence shows. He should not depart from the role of an impartial
172
judge. He must direct the trial in accordance with recognized
procedure and in a manner so as to bring an end to the hearing with-
out prejudice to either party. He may avoid cluttering up the pro-
ceedings with unnecessary, immaterial, or repetitious questions or issues
<
He must be careful to remain impartial and scrupulously fair through-
173
out the trial.
167 United States v. .Green, 176 F.2d 3.69 (2d Cir., 194-9)
168 Hallinan v. United States . 132 F.2d 880 (9th Cir., 1950) cert,
den., 341 U. S. 952
169 United States v. wheeler. 219 F.2d 773 (7th Cir., 1955)
170 United_States v. Pennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir., 1950) aff 'd 341 U.S.494
171 par. 39a., MCM, 1951
172 par. 73c, MCM, 1951
173 United States v. Jackson, 3 USCMA 646, 14 CMR 64 (1954)
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PREglMTJffJL l^MMU^&,"W^M^-^ ^ a general court-
martial the president has certain duties which are normally exercised
174
by the judge of a federal court* The president sets the time and
place of trial and prescribes the uniform to be worn; and he may con-
175
suit with the law officer as to the time the trial, commences* The
17<
law officer may also be consulted by counsel as to the time of assembly
but apparently should not discuss a continuance with one counsel in
177
the absence of the other. The president, as presiding officer of
the court, takes appropriate action to preserve order in the open
17a
sessions. He shares this duty with the law officer, since the latter
179
initiates contempt proceedings, and is responsible for the orderly
180 •
conduct of the trial. The president may recess or adjourn the
...court, subject to the request of counsel that a certain portion of the
trial be completed first, which ruling rests solely with the lav; officer
181 . •
as. an interlocutory matter. There is clearly a distinction between
a recess or adjournment oh the' one hand and a continuance on the other,
the ruling on the latter being entirely within the law officer's dis-
.cretion.~S2 Lastly, the president is the spokesman for the court and
183
presides during closed sessions. In many respects he is like a
jury foreman.
W •« n — M r* •»." um mmm mm em -». * am» ••« — ^— m*~ mm tm* m • ••«•*—. *«•«>• <m* m» mm « *-* mm mm
174 per, 40b o , MCM, 1951
175 par. 58b., HCM, 1951
176 par. 39b,, MCM, 1951
177 CM 391199, Brow.. 16 October 1956
178.par..4Cb(l).(b), MCM, 1951
179 par. 118b., MCM, 1951
180 par. 39b., MCM, 1951
181 par. 40b (lj(d), MCM, 1951
182 par. 58b., MCM, 1951 .
183 par. 40b (l)(e), MCM, 1951 .
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It may be contended that the law officer should assume those
duties of the president which are not connected with court delibera-
tions. But since the president is usually the senior military officer
in the courtroom, it would not be consistent with military precedents
for him to be subordinate to the law officer in these administrative
matters,. If the military services as a policy were to utilize law
officers senior to the president in rank, then the Manual should
appropriately be changed in order to give full control of the trial
to the law officer. However , under current practice, it is better for
the law officer to retain only that power necessary to exercise con-
trol during the trial when these administrative matters become inter-
locutory in nature.
.DISQIIAWIQA^N /F,,TPPG£ OR,J,AW">X?Xg^R, Knowledge of -ertain
facts relating to the issues on the part of the federal judge before
trial commencement is not prohibited. It, of course, cannot extend
to bias or prejudice." The military rule in this respect, although
the Code and the Manual are silent, does not appear to be unduly re-
strictive. In a U. S. Air Force case, the lav; officer, who also was
an assistant staff judge advocate, reviewed the pre-trial investigation
for the purpose of familiarizing himself with legal issues that might
develop during the trial. Ke denied that he reached any conclusion
or had any personal interest in the outcome. The Eoard of Review was
of the opinion that such prior knowledge by the law officer was in-
135
sufficient to challenge the law officer for cause. The U. S. Court
184 Co .3., judges, Sec. 93
185 ACM, 9429, Cayender, 17 GMR 938, pet. rev. den., 20 CIjR 398
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of Military Appeals has very recently considered the same factual
situation in United States v. Fry. ° The court expressed the opinion
that the Ian officer's reviewing the pretrial investigation and summar-
ies of expected testimony prior to trial was not good practice because
it is too close to a violation of the spirit of the Code and the lianual
to merit approval j but in this particular case the record did not show
that the accused was harmed thereby. Consequently, it is believed that
the law officer's conduct during a trial will be carefully scrutinized
in the future when there is evidence that he has prior Imowledge
of the facts, but that, as in the federal courts, mere knowledge..of
certain facts before trial will not be of itself grounds for challeng-
ing hinu
Personal disqualification by. the trial judge in a criminal court
is his duty on his own motion whenever he has an interest in or is
biased regarding a particular case. Hearing a closely related case
or again presiding after a particular case has been remanded does not
in and of itself disqualify himj there must be an actual showing of bias.
Personal disqualification of the law officer in the military is
based on certain statutory reasons, such as being the accuser, a
witness for the prosecution, investigating officer, or as counsel.
The lianual goes further by stating as examples that participation in
the trial of a closely related case, or upon a rehearing or a new trial,
having first heard the case, are other circumstances constituting grounds
189
for challenge. And the lav; officer has a duty to disclose any
q
186 7 TJSCMA 682, 23 CMR 146 (1957)
187 C. J. S., Judges, Sec. 93
188 30 Am. Jur., Judges, Sec. 32
189 par. 62f (13), MCii, 1951
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possible grounds for challenge.
The unqualified language of the Manual appears to be unduly
restrictive for a law officer to be subject to challenge for cause
in an allied case or in a rehearing, particularly in view of the Code's
provision that carts-martial apply when practicable the principles of
law recognised in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
191district courts. ' Thus it would appear that a challenge of the
lav; officer for cause based upon this llanual provision should be
limited to the situation where there can be a showing of actual pre-
judice or bias on his part. Obviously the record would be subject
to close scrutiny on review. Such a construction of the Manual would
then make the law parallel the federal rule and would also be practical.
In one Army case, a Board of Review held there to be error where the
same law officer sat at a rehearing after stating on voir dire that
192
he could impartially and faithfully perform his duties. In follow-
ing the Board of Review decision and the Manual, if a law officer
were automatically disqualified by having served as such in an allied
case, six accused tried separately would require six different lav;
officers.
Although there is a duty on the part of the law officer to make
193
known possible grounds upon which he may be subject to challenge,
what should he do when knowing that he is prejudiced? Divulging the
factual reason to the court for its ruling on a challenge might be
194
prejudicial. As an example, consider a situation where the lav;
190 United States v. Schuller. 5 USCMA 101, 17 CMR 101 (1954)
191 Art. 36, UCMJ
192 CM 375027, Grosel . 17 CMR 394
193 United States v. Schuller
. 5 USCMA 101, 17 CMR 101 (1954)
194 United States v. Richard, 7 USCMA 46, 21 CMR 172 (1956)
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officer has good reason to believe that the accused at some previous
time had stolen property from him. Merely telling the court members
that he is prejudiced against the accused may be insufficient for them
to sustain a proper challenge. Easier and more properly he should
195
disqualify himself forthwith in accordance with the civilian practice."
PUBLIC TRIAL, A public trial is not extended in a federal
court so as to allow the taking of photographs and the transmission
of radio broadcasts. To prevent it Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Frocedure was purposely incorporated in view of the diffi-
culties experienced in some state courts. £ public trial is a right
which is guaranteed to the defendant in a federal district court by
196
the Constitution. Any detraction from this right implies a preju-
197
dice which is practically impossible to prove by direct evidence.
But in the federal court, it is not necessary for the judge to admit
spectators in such numbers so as to overcrowd the courtroom and take
the space ordinarily occupied by court officers, jurors, \ri.tnesses, and
relatives and friends of the defendant. ' However, the judge may
exclude youthful persons whose minds may be contaminated by the ex-
199
pected evidence in the trial of sex offenses. It has been held to
be prejudicial for him to exclude all persons except members of the
bar, newsmen, and relatives of the defendant.*" The U. S. Supreme
Court has decided that at least counsel, friends, and relatives of
the defendant should be permitted to attend the trial no matter with
195 CPI 390142, T^rrente, 21. CIIR 491. •
,
196 U. S. Const., Amend.- VI




.1 United States. 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir., 1944)
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201
what the defendant may be charged.
Admission of spectators in a court-martial does not e:rtend to
photographing in or broadcasting from a courtroom. The Manual goes
cne step further, however, than the Federal Rifles of Criminal Proce-
dure by also excluding television.^ As for the exclusion of spec-
203tators in a court-martial, the law officer is governed by the Manual,
It states that as a general rule the public should be allowed to
attend; but for security or other good reasons, it may be excluded by
the convening authority. The mechanics for accomplishing this are not
set forth. As a suggested method, the convening authority vrauld notify
the court when it meets. Since the convening authority with his assis-
tants is in a better position to determine the need for security,
his decision should unquestionably be respected. In the case of "other
good reasons", the law officer may ultimately bs the one to determine
whether or not spectators should be excluded. This conclusion is based
upon the decisions of the U. S„ Court of Military Appeals regarding
the interference by the convening authority with the lav; officer's per-
formance of duty,*1 4 IJhen the law officer is called upon to rule on
the exclusion of spectators, he should . exercise care to do so in his
own right, irrespective of any convening authority directive, in order
that the record will show that he acted free from and did not release
his power to the convening authorityj in all probability he will follow
the. latter 's advice* ....
201 Re
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Olliver, 333 U. S. 257 (194-3)
202 par. 53e., MCM, 1951
203 Ibid.
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A recent case has been decided by the I J. S. Court of Military
Appeals settling several questions regarding public trials in the
205
military. It involved the offense of communicating obscene lan-
guage over a telephone. The convening authority had directed that
the public, except those whom the accused wished to nominate, be excluded
from the trial; the accused objected and was overruled by the law offi-
cer. In the decision, the U. S. Court of Military Appeals reviewed
the civilian rule on public trials, including those federal cases
heretofore discussed.. Also cited were two state court decisions, the
first holding that it is permissible to temporarily exclude the public
if a small child cannot testify before an audience, and the second
being the notorious Jelhe case in which the press was improperly ex-
207
eluded in a vice trial. The U. 3. Court of military Appeals stated
that the Manual provision ° must be construed within strict limits
if it is to be upheld in the light of the same Court's previous ruling
209
on military due process, It concluded that there had been too
great a restriction imposed by the convening authority and by the law
officer and that the accused was entitled to have members of the press
in attendance. As dictum, the opinion cuoted liinthrop who had stated
that, if the court determines, the proceedings shall not be reported
other than officially and members of tie press could be prohibited from
210
talcing notes j the dictum went on to state that this rule could be
205 United States, v. Brown, 7 USCMA 251, 22 CMt 41 (1956)
206 Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437 (1935)
207 People v. Jelke. 30S N. Y. 56 (1954)
20S par. 53e., MCI I, 1951
209 United States v. Clay. 1 USCMA 74, 1 CM?, 74 (1951)
210 UinthropMilitary Law and Precedents, 2d ed., 1920 Reprint, p.162
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applied if matters of national security were involved. It is believed
a":.3v.vd t© hold a trial with persons in; attendance not properly cleared to
handle security matters. ... .
.Although most newspapermen are loyal and xwuld be willing to
respect regulations concerning classified material, any particular one
of them desiring to profit with a "sccop" could be tempted, to divulge
the information developed at the trial—and without the benefit of
notes, ijlso there are undoubtedly correspondents whose political
interests are contrary to those of the United States. Selection and
admission of those who could be trusted, although possible at the
supreme command level, would be almost impossible in the field where
the court-martial would be sitting. In addition to the security
question, which the court left undecided, there also was the problem
of v/ho, the convening authority or the law officer, makes the final
determination. In the Brown case, there was no need to determine
this issue. However, law officers are reminded to make their own in-
dependant ruling so as not to surrender power to the convening authority.
It would seem that the safest course for a law officer to
follow at this time would be: (1) close the court upon motion in se-
curity cases, but only during such portions of the trial as necessary
to receive the classified evidence, even though the accused objects
j
(2) close the court for any other reason while receiving evidence only
upon the accused being given a specific opportunity to object j (3)
remove youthful persons from the courtroom only while immoral testi-
mony is being received; and (4) admit at least counsel, relatives,
and friends of the accused in (2) and (3).
43
CgALLEttGES * Prospective jurors may te challenged for cause
211
by the parties to a criminal proceeding in the federal court system.
It is a serious duty of the court to determine the question of bias
on the part of a juror; it has broad discretion in carrying out its
duty „'-'-^ This discretion extends to the questions asked of jurors;
its decision will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear show-
21^
ing of abuse. Under the Rules, the court may perr.it the defendant
or his attorney and the attorney for the government to examine pros-
pi /
pective jurors; or the court may examine the jurors itself. If
the court conducts the examination, it should permit the defendant
and the government attorney to supplement the examination as the
215
court deems proper. The court itself may excuse a juror for cause.
2n 6
There is a provision for alternate jurors * to prevent mistrials
due to the subsequent disqualification or inability of a juror to
237
complete his duties. •
In the military certain reasons for challenge are automatically
218
disqualifying. There are also others which may be sufficient
219
grounds for sustaining a challenge for cause. For instance, the
fact that a member of the court will be a witness for the prosecu-
tion is an example of the former, whereas the fact that the member
participated in the trial of a closely related case is an example of
211 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24-
212 Dennis v. United State s. 339 U. 3, 162 (195C)
213 Speak v. United States. 161 F.2d 562 (10th Cir., 1947)
214 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 42(a)
215 Yarborough v.. United..States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir., 1956) cert.
den., 351 U. 3. 969
"
. 216 Federal Rules, of Criminal Procedure,. Rule 42(c)
217 Gillars v. United States, 182 F. 2d 962 (D.C. Cir., 1950)
218 Art. 25(d)(2), UCNJ :....,
219 par. 62f., MCM, 1951
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the latter. Contrary to the federal judge ruling upon the qualifica-
tion of a prospective juror who has been challenged for cause, the
court members in a court-martial vote upon whether or not a challenge
220
for cause should be sustained. This appears even to be true inhere
it would be illegal under the Code for the member to serve on the court,
The lav; provides for the ruling on challenges for cause being decided
by the court members; there is no reference to the law officer having
any power in the matter.
In a recent decision by the U, S. Court of Military Appeals
it was held that the law officer himself could challenge a court mem-
221ber for cause. In that case, after prosecution evidence had begun,
a court member stated that he believed he had sat as a member on the
trial of a closely related case. The law officer excused the court
member subject to objection by any member of the court. No member of
the court objected but the defense counsel took issue arguing that he
would prefer the member sit on the court.
The opinion held that, since a member generally could be excused
after arraignment only upon challenge for cause under the Code, it was
apparent that the law officer excused the member on the basis of
challenge, and that, although he ruled on the challenge subject to the
objection of any member, it was error. It further stated that there
was no claim and the court could discern no likelihood that the pro-
cedure improperly influenced the remaining members of the trial court
or prejudiced the accused in any substantial right. A majority of the
220 Art,- 51,- UC1U
221 United State s v. Jone s
? 7 USCMA 283, 22. CNR 73 (1956)
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court were of the opinion, while discussing challenges, that a member
could only be removed after a vote by the court in conformance with
Articles 51(a) and 52 of the Code. Chief Judge Quinn, who wrote the
opinion, was in the minority when he stated that it was an empty ritual
for the court to take a formal vote when a member must be excused.
However, the court concluded that the law officer had a right to chal-
lenge a court member for cause on his own motion, either during the
regular challenging procedure or during the trial of the issues.
It is unfortunate that the other judges did not agree with Chief
Justice Quinn in his empty ritual concept. If the law officer were
allowed to rule on challenges, he would be able to prevent the court
from making an erroneous decision, particularly in regard to the first
222
eight reasons for challenge in the Manual. These reasons are that
the prospective member is: (1) not eligible to serve, (2) not appointed,
(3) the accuser, (4.) a prospective prosecution witness, (5) the inves-
tigating officer, (6) the person who acted as opposing counsel, (7)
upon rehearing or new trial a member which first heard the case, and
(8) an enlisted member of the same unit as the accused. At best the
law officer could only recess and notify the convening authority if
the court erred in deciding the challenge $ otherwise his only solution
would be to declare a mistrial. And these remedies might also be his
only recourse if the court 'erroneously decided a challenge for cause
based on a reason other than the first eight Manual grounds.
The decision by the U. 3. Court of Military Appeals treated the
field of challenges regardless of xjhen made j there is no indication
222 par. 62f., liCh, 1951
as to whether it was done purposely or inadvertently. This too was
unfortunate because the decision was in part based on .Article 29(a),
which states in effect that a member shall not- be absent or excused
after arraignment except for physical disability, or as a result of
challenge, or by order of the convening authority for good cause.
The Code is silent on the question of excusing members before arraign-
223
merit . The Manual states that a member of the court shall not be
absent during the trial except for physical disability, as a result
224
of challenge, or by order of the convening authority. It is noted
that this provision paraphrases the statute without defining what is
meant by "trial". The Uanual provision continues tyT stating that a
member should notify the convening authority if he believes there are
reasons he should not sit on a particular case as enumerated in para-
graph 62f (dealing with grounds for challenge).
As for the procedure to be followed for relieving court mem-
bers between the time the court first meets and the arraignment, it
has heretofore been considered that the challenge route is the only
method. Such challenge would depend upon the voluntary disclosure of
grounds for challenge by the court members, the law officer, or coun-
sel, as well as other grounds developed on voir dire. But there may
be a latent power residing with the law officer which is not readily
apparent, based upon the following reasoning. The Manual provides that
the law officer or a member x-/ho is subject to challenge because of one
of the foregoing enumerated eight reasons as contained in par. 62f
223 Art. 29(a), DC1U
224 par. 41c, MCM, 1951
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shall be excused forthwith. "^ The Manual ,is silent as to who will
excuse him. Further, in United. States v. .Ulen
,
the U, S. Court
of Military .Appeals, while discussing the power to excuse members from
sitting on a case, said,
•
- "... no doubt is entertained that a convening authority-
may validly delegate to his staff judge advocate, to the
.
. president of the com-t-martial, or to any other impartial
official person, the power to excuse appointed court mem-
bers for spod cause. Under this grant of power, the ap-
proval of an excuse submitted by a member would import
a genuine exercise of discretion as to the existence of
other official duties, or similar circumstances, which serve
to raise a conflict with prospective court service."
This quotation, particularly since it is found in a case involving the
failure of all court members named in the appointing order to attend
the commencement of the trial, would seem, to be applicable to those
situations arising before the court convenes. But need it be so
limited? Merely, by extending to the lav; officer the power to excuse
members for good cause, there is nothing in the Code or the Manual
which would preclude him from so acting prior to arraignment. To
conform with the language in the Allen case," the convening authority
could delegate to the law officer in the appointing order power to
excuse members for cause. For instance, assuming that a member of the
court states that he has already formed an opinion in the case, the
la\T officer could excuse the member for cause without there being a
challenge. And if a party had challenged the member for cause, the
la\i officer could still take the initiative, basing his action on his
power to excuse rather than make a ruling on the challenge itself.
225 par. 62(c), MC11, 1951
226 5 USCMA 626, IS C1JR 250 (1955)
227 Ibid.
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Whether or not he would excuse the member then would be discretionary
with him; if he failed to excuse the person, there would still exist
the right to have the ' court members determine if the challenge should
be sustained. Support for this position may be found in Judge Lati-
mer's article in the Temple Law Quarterly in which he said, while
discussing the apparent disqualification of a court member, " ••• the
lav/ officer may excuse the member forthwith". This procedure
would be more in keeping with the Congressional and the U. S. Court
of Military Appeals intent to have the law officer serve as nearly
like a federal judge as possible, rather than narrow his powers as
. 229the Jones case seemed to do.
CONTEMPTS . Both federal courts and courts-martial have the power
to punish contempts, but the procedure is quite different. In the
federal court a contempt may be punished summarily by the judge if he
certifies that he saw or heard the conduct which is the basis for the
230
contempt, and that it was committed in the presence of the court.
Other type's of contempts may be punished but only after notice and,
231if Congress so provides, a jury trial. ' If the contempt involves
disrespect toward or criticism of the judge himself, he is disqualified
232 233from sitting. ^ This rule was derived from Cooke v. United States
which concluded that the judge should step down from the bench and
arrange for another judge to preside over the contempt proceedings.
Rat he should not allow himself to be driven from a case. Trial by
228 A Comparative Analysis of Federal and Military Criminal Procedure
29 Temple L. Q. 1 (1955)
229 United States v. Jones, 7 USCLiA 283, 22 CMR 73 (1956)
230 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4.2(a)
231 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule -42(b)
232 Ibid .
.
233 267 U. S. 517 (1924)
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'another judge prevents 'any- "chance" of unfairness when misconduct of
2'34
the judge ha's been alleged. " A judge, in his discretion, may postpone
the summary proceedings until after the trial of the case in which the
235
contempt occurred.
A court-martial may punish any person for contempt who uses any
.manacing words, signs, or gestures in its presence or who disturbs
236its proceedings by .any riot or disorder. Other types of contempts
such as the failure to obey a subpoena, are referred to a federal dis-
237
trict court.
For direct contempts, the type which a court-martial may punish
for conduct in its presence, the drafters of the Manual considered
238
the question to be interlocutory. The Ilanual itself sets forth
239
the method of proceeding whenever a contempt occurs. It provides
for the offender being given an opportunity to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt. Then the law officer treats the matter
in a preliminary question as to whether or not the person should be
held in contempt, and, in doing so according to the Manual, disposes
of it similarly as he would in the case of a motion for a finding
of not guilty. Thus he makes his ruling subject to the objection of
any member of the court. 2y+° If his ruling;.or the determination of the
court is adverse to the party, the court then in closed session
234 Schmidt v. United States. 115 F.2d 394, 398 (6th Cir., 1940)
235 Sacher v. United ..Spates. 343 U. S. 1 (1952)
236 Art. 48, UGMJ
237 Aft. 47", UGMJ
238 Legal and Legislative Basis, MCM, 1951, p. 107
239 par. 118b., MCM, 1951
240 Art. 51, UCMJ '
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determines whether or not to convict, v/ith the concurrence of two-
241
thirds of the members being required. The Code does not pre-
scribe the procedure bywhich a person shell be held in contempt.
Other than challenges, which are decided by the court, there are only
two instances when, according to the Code, the ruling of the law officer
is not final: in a motion for a finding of not guilty; and in a ques-
242
tion regarding the insanity of the accused. On all other inter-
locutory questions his ruling is final and binding on the court.
The drafters of the Manual thus adopted in contempt procedure
a method of ruling which is not final by the law officer even though
it is an interlocutory question. i-Iay not the Manual provision be
considered contrary to the Code? Possibly so, in view of the permissive
Code provision for the President of the United States making court-
martial rules, so far as he deems practicable, which shall apply the
principals of lav; recognized in the trial of criminal cases in United
States district courts, and in view of Rule -42(a), which provides
for summarily contempt punishment by the judge. The Manual, therefore,
is the chief bar to the law officer acting in the same manner as a
federal judge in a direct contempt. This may be a natural inheritance
from previous armed forces court-martial procedures. Also the framers
of the Manual could not have foreseen the lav; officer's rise in power
as a result of the Court of Military Appeals' decisions so as to place
him wherever possible on a level with the federal judge. They may
241 par, 118b., MCM, 1951
242 Art. 51, UCMJ
24-3 Art. 36, UCMJ
244 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 42(a)
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also have been bothered by the fact that the lav; officer does not have
any sentencing powers, although, like the judge, he has fact finding-
powers regarding admissibility of evidence. This could have been
possibly overcome by giving the lav; officer power to determine whether
or not the offender is in contempt and giving the court members the
power to sentence. And it may be difficult for a test case of the
Manual procedure reaching the U. S. Court of Military Appeals due to
the limited review prescribed for contempt proceedings (convening
authority only).^-\ The test may .in the future arise where a law
officer either purposely or inadvertently rules on a contempt question
without referring it to the court. Then on appeal of the case in chief
on its own merits, the high court may discuss this particular point.
Case history in the military under the new Code on this point is nil.
Also in doubt in the military is the procedure which should be
followed if the contempt involves a personal attack on either a member
of the court, the entire court, or the law officer in the presence
of the court. If the lav; officer were to make the final ruling in a
contempt, the situation would be simplified; but under the present
246
method of hearing a contempt, it might be necessary, in conforming
with the federal rule, 247 for the person or persons under attack to
withdraw from the contempt hearing and allow the remainder to decide
this interlocutory issue, with the appointment of additional temporary
personal if required.
245 par. 118b, llCii, 1951
246 par. 118, MCM, 1951
247 Federal Rules of Criminal. Procedure, Rule 42
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CONTINUANCES
. A continuance may be granted by a federal judge,
but the decision is within his discretion, and, in the absence of a
>P
249
showing of prejudice, it will not be disturbed on review. It appears
that- the party requesting the continuance must have been diligent,
250
not responsible for the needed delay, and that denial will probably
251
effect the result of trial. There must be a clear showing of abuse
252
of discretion for there to be any relief on review.
In the military, the llanual provides for a postponement, which,
although similar to a continuance, occurs before trial as the result
of an agreement between counsel and the president of the court, with
the latter being able to consult with the law officer as to its neces-
253
sity, •'-' The inconvenience of meeting for a formal continuance is
thus avoided. The llanual also provides for requesting before trial
254
a continuance from the convening authority. After commencement of
255
the trial, the Manual provides, in conformance with the Code, that
a continuance may be granted by the court in its discretion upon the
showing of reasonable cause ,256 Th^g discretion is not reversible
257
unless abused to the prejudice of the accused. These Manual pro-
visions follow the federal rule.
o<?$
In United States v. Knudson. ° the lav; officer granted a continu-
ance pending the receipt of a reply from a communication sent by the
248 Finnefian v. United State s. 204 F.2d 105 (8th Cir., 1953)
249 Buxton v. United States . 175 F,2d 960 (5th Cir., 1949)
250 Cyc. Fed, Proc, Sec, 45.01 et seq,
251 United States v. Bronson . 145 F,2d 939 (2d Cir., 1944)
252 United States v. Yager, 220 F,2d 795 (7th Cir,, 1955)
. 253 par, '53b., LcTl, 1951
.
254 par. 5Se., HCII, 1951
255 Art, 40, UCKJ ,: ."-'
256 par* .58, nCH, 1951
257 United States v, Parrish . 7 USC11A 337, 22 CiJR 127 (1956)
258 United States v . Knudson, 4 USC1-IA 587, 16 CliR 161 (1954)
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. accused to the Secretary of the Navy requesting that he not be tried.
The convening authority directed that the trial proceed and criticized
the law officer for having exceeded his authority. The U. S. Court
of Military Appeals stated that, the convening authority's intervention
i^as illegal and discredited the law officer in the eyes of the trial
court e Although there is no quarrel with the decision in respect to
the determination that the convening authority should not interfere
with the law officer's ruling, it is unfortunate that the rule of lav;
was based on this particular set of facts. It is believed that the
ground for the continuance was not valid and Judge Latimer's dissent
on this point is favored.
qgE&MS? €F. WJSE8E83BS . In both types of courts this subject
is important. Within the federal criminal system the judge has a duty
to see that the case is properly presented in such a way that it is
understood by the jury, and to do so, he may question witnesses in
259
order to elicit further information or to clarify the facts. ' He
should confine testimony to relevant matters and question witnesses^
so that all the truth is brought out in a nonprejudicial way to obtain
justice. He has broad discretion in allowing the recall and cross-
examination. He may thus control unnecessary humiliation of a witness.
He should not indicate any personal feeling in his examination of wit**
nesses and _ should remain fair and impartial to both the government and
the defendant. < ' The judge may call witnesses, but the practice is
259 United States v, Rosenberg. 195 F.2& 563 (2d Sir. £ 195-2) cert,
den., 344 U.S.838
260 Undted_States v. Stoebr. 100 Fed. Supp, 143 (li.D.Pc, 1951) aff'd.,
196 F. 2d 276, cert, den., 344 U. S. 826
261 Ibid.
262 Uilcoxon v. .United States., 231 F.2d 384 (10th Cir., 1956) cert.
den., 351 U. S. 943 , . . . .
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263
considered -undesirable. In his discretion he may call a particular
264
witness and allox^ both sides the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Before a court-martial, the Manual permits the questioning of
?65
witnesses by the law officer and the court members. The questions
must reccin within the bounds of cross-examination material, if the
accused is questioned, but in the case of any other witness new
matter may be brought up, subject, of course, to objection and further
266
cross-examination. Although the ilanual allows a broad cross-
examination of witnesses^ the law officer may prevent repititious
267
questioning of a discrediting type through inuendos and insinuations.
But he cannot limit the cross-examination of a witness merely, because
268
proof of prior misconduct is not in hand. Ee may permit the cross-
examination of the accused about his prior- misconduct as a matter
269
within his discretion. Limiting the cross-examination of witnesses
270
is within his discretion, but it has been stated that he should
271
allow a wide latitude. The law officer may question a witness to
272
develop facts as long as he does so in a fair and impartial way.
But it is error for him to cross-examine a witness like a prosecutor
while trying to impeach a witness, introduce new material, and attempt
to discredit the defense theory after there has been a thorough examina-
263 Krogmann v. United^ State s, 225 F.2d 220 (6th Cir., 1955)
264 United States- v. llsrzanp, 149 F.2d 923 (2d Cir., 1945)
265 Steinberg v. United States, 162 F.2d 120 (5th Cir., 1947) cert.
den., 332 U. S. 80S
266 par. 149b (3), I-JCM, 1951
267 United States v. Long. 2 USCMA 60, 6 CliR 60 (1952)
268 United States v. Berthiaume, 5 USCMA 669, 18 CliR 293 (1955)
269 United States v. Hutchins, 6 USCMA 17, 19 CIR 143 (1955)
270 ACM 11127, Parrish, 21 CIR 639, reviewed but not discussed, United
States v. Parrish. 7 U3CI1A 337, 22 CIR 127 (1956)
271 United States v. Hernandez, 4 USCMA 465, 16 CliR 39 (1954)
272 United States v. Berry, 6 USCMA 638, 20 CliR 354 (1956)
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273
tion by the trial counsel. The same rule also applies to question-
ing by court members, and the law officer has a duty to control the
07/
proceedings so as to prevent it.
The Manual provides for the calling of witnesses by the corrt,275
but -does not state what is meant by the "court", ie. the lav; officer
or the court members. The power of the latter in regard to calling
witnesses has been considered by the U. S. Court of Military Appeals
27o
in the Parker case."" There, the court had closed for the considera-
tion of the findings only to reopen and request additional evidence
along certain lines. The defense claimed this action by the court was
tantamount to a finding of not guilty and so moved. The motion was
overruled, certain witnesses were recalled, and the accused sub-
sequently found guilty. The U. S, Court of Military Appeals, mindful
of the provision in the procedural guide of the Manual that whether or
not a witness should be called is subject to the final determination
277
of the law officer, and the Code provision that the law officer's
?78
ruling is final on interiocutory questions, concluded that, " ...
a court-martial has the unrestricted right to call for further witnesses,
subject only to the law officer's determination of admissibility,"
And it held this rule to exist even though the court members had
retired to consider the findings. The opinion further stated that
273 N.CM 56 00575, Osborne. 21 CMR 556
274 United States v. Blank'enship . 7 USCMA 328, 22CIE 118 (1956)
275 pars. 54b. and 149a., MCM, 1951
276 United. States v. Parker, 7 USCMA 182, 21 CLE 308 (1956)
277 apo. 8a., MCM, 1951, p.~517
278 Art. 51(b), UCMJ
5^
the court must not desert its role as triers of fact to join the ranks
27°
of partisan advocates, citing the Smith case.
280
In the United States v. Salley . the court indicated a desire
to see certain medical records concerning the accused. The lav; officer
stated that the records probably would be inadmissible, but that any
person who physically examined the accused could be called as a wit-
ness. After further discussion, the court withdrew its request. On
appeal, it was contended that the lav; officer insufficiently advised
the court of its right to examine records and call witnesses in connec-
tion with the physical and mental condition of the accused. The
U. S. Court of Military Appeals held that the law officer did no
more than indicate how he might rule concerning the admissibility of
the medical records and pointed out a more advantageous method of
obtaining the desired information* Further, the court reiterated
that a court-martial has an unrestricted right to call for further
witnesses, subject only to the law officer's determination of admis-
sibility.
On its face the above discussed opinions would appear to detract
rather than add to the power of the law officer because of the "un-
restricted right" language contained therein. But being able to "call"
for a witness is one thing; allowing the witness to testify is another.
And the qualification that such testimony is subject to the law officer's
ruling on admissibility weakens the power of the court members even
more. For instance, if a court member asks for a certain witness to
279 United States v. Smithy 6 USCMA 521, 20 CMR. 237 (1955)
280 7 USCI1A 603, 23 CM 67 (1957)
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be called to give particular testimony, the law officer might be
able to determine immediately that such evidence would be irrelevant,
and so rule, thereby obviating the necessity of even having the witness
appear in court. It certainly should not be required that the witness
take the stand and then have all his testimony ruled inadmissible
because of irrelevance. Such procedure would merely be an empty
ritual. But the law officer must proceed warily in this area. So
in conclusion, these decisions probably do not actually detract
from the law officer's power at all, but only stand for the rule that
a court member may have an unrestricted right to have a witness called
or recalled! and this to be true even though the court has closed to
vote on the findings. Since the Manual does not specify that the law
officer may also call witnesses, these decisions may also stand for the
position that he has the sane power, because it would be difficult
to rationalize that the court members possess it but the law officer
does not. However, he should proceed most carefully so as not to
depart from his impartial position and become a partisan advocate.
The powers of the judge and the law officer in their treatment of wit-
nesses appears, therefore, to be abcut the same.
MISTRIAL < A motion for mistrial is recognized in the federal
courts as appropriate, although there is no mention made of it in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is used to discharge a jury
261
to prevent the defeat of the ends of justice. If a juror is with-
drawn, the use of alternate jurors prevents the need of declaring a
pop
mistrial. The military may accomplish the same result by having
281 Scott v. United States, 202 F2d 354- (D.C. Gir., 1952) cert, den.,
3AA U."S. 379
2S2 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24(c)
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more than the minimum number of five members hear the particular case.
In federal trials, but not so much so in the military, newspaper arti-
283
cles reaching and influencing the jurors have presented a problem.
T her,ever the judge becomes aware of information which may be the basis
for a mistrial, it is his duty to ascertain if the jury or the member
284
has been influenced thereby.
.Another basis for a mistrial is improper remarks or conduct by
285
counsel. Comment by the proseoxitor on the presentation of the
defense to the effect that an alibi is "lousy" has been held insuf-
ficient to shot-/ an abuse of discretion when the judge refuses to order
286
a mistrial. Improper examination or cross-examination of a witness
2G7
may be grounds for a mistrial if it is prejudicial. T.,here there
are improper questions asked of the defendant, there is no ground for
283
a mistrial where an objection to the questioning is sustained."




Until recently the military had believed only the convening
290
authority had the power to declare a mistrial. Before the Code, the
term mistrial existed in certain military law text books, but its use
291
was in connection with discussions of former jeopardy, and not as
283 Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cir., 1955)
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to whether the court itself could declare a mistrial. The aspect of
the law officer having such power was first raised before the U. S.
29?
Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Stringer. In that
case, the president of the court made improper remarks due to the
fact that the prosecution's case was badly prepared. The convening
author itjr subsequently withdrew the case from the court and referred
it to another. The Court of Military Appeals thoroughly explored the
conduct of the court, the law officer, and the convening authority.
It leaned heavily on the federal practice in its decision that the
lav; officer has the power to declare a mistrial. But whether or not he
shares this power with the convening authority is still in doubt.
This conclusion is reached because the late Judge Brosman, who wrote
the court opinion, believed that the primary power rested with the
convening authority and reluctantly agreed with the other two members
of the court that the lav; officer also could declare a mistrial.
Chief Judge Quinn was of the opinion that the lav; officer was the only
one with the power. Judge Latimer believed that both could exercise
it. In United States v. Richard , " the same court composed of Chief
Judge Quinn and Judge Latimer, stated that a mistrial was the proper
method of disposing of a situation where one member of the court makes
certain prejudicial disclosures to the other court members when stating
the grounds upon which he himself is subject to challenge. Since
Judge Ferguson, who was appointed to the vacancy left ay the late
Judge Brosman, did not participate in the decision, there is at present
still doubt as to whether the power is exclusive or shared by the law
292 5 USCMA 122, 17 CMR 122 (1954)
293 7 USCMA 46, 21 CUR 172 (1956)
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officer with the convening authority.
.Another point of interest is raised by a statement by Chief
29/
Judge Quinn in the Stringer case ' in which he said, " ... if the
lav; officer improperly grants a mistrial, his ruling may then be sub-
j ect to review by the convening authority under . the provisions of
paragraph 67f of the Manual .„." The cited Manual paragraph states
that a convening. authority may return a record of trial to the court,
if he disagrees with the action of the law officer, with the direction
that the court reconvene and reconsider its ruling. It further states
that if the difference of opinion relates to a matter of law, the
court will accede to the views of the convening authority* but if the
disagreement extends to issues of fact, the court will use its sound
discretion upon reconsideration. Whether or not a mistrial should
be declared is believed to fall in the factual category so that the
convening authority may not overrule the law officer and direct that
he proceed with the trial.
295
As has been stated above, and recognized by the. U. S. Court
296
of Military Appeals, the granting of a motion for a mistrial rests
within the discretion of the trial judge • it is subject to review only
297
when the discretion has been abused. In United J^tate s v. Knudson ,
where the convening authority addressed a letter to the law officer
stating that he had abused his authority in granting a continuance,
the IT. S. Court of Military Appeals held that the convening authority
illegally interfered with the law officer's decision. Similarly,
294 United States v. Stringer, 5 USCMA 122, 17 CMR 122 (1954)
295 Wiltsey V, United States.' 222 F. 2d 600 (4th Cir., 1955)
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returning a record of trial to a court, the convening authority, when
directing reconsideration of the ruling on a mistrial, may, in effect,
he stating that the law officer abused his discretion. Consequently,
although it seems settled that the law officer has the power to grant
a mistrial, the question of its finality and exclusiveness is still
in doubt.
INSTRUCTIONS. Prior to deliberating, instructions must be given
298
to the jury by the federal judge and to the court members by the
299law officer. The requirements differ somewhat. The federal judge
should be furnished desired instructions in writing at the close of
the evidence, and he informs the parties prior to argument of instruc-
tions he will give. Error cannot be assigned unless objection is made
to the particular instruction, stating clearly the grounds therefor.
Failure to submit requests timely for instructions is ground for not
301
considering them. But it is error not to rule on each instruction
302
requested. The reason for the objection is to inform the court
303
of error or omission so that it may be corrected. Rarely will a
trial court's judgment be reversed for failing to give instructions in
the absence of a seasonable request or exception, and then only if it
304
constitutes a basic and highly prejudicial error.
In the military, the Code in general provides for the law officer
giving instructions on the elements of the offense charged, burden of
298 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30
\ 299 Act. 51(c), UCliJ
300 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3C
301 Putman v , Ifoited_States, 162 F„2d 903 (5th Cir., 1947)
302 Ross v. United States, ISO F.2d 160 (6th Cir., 1950)
303 United States v. Wilson . 154- F.2d 802 (2d Cir., 194-6)
304 Cave v. United States. 159 F.2d 4-64 (8th Cir., 1947)
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proof, presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt. According to
305
the Manual, a requested instruction should be in writing* But the
court*-martial system does not provide for the waiver approach whenever
there is a failure to request an instruction, unless it is minor in
nature; on the contrary, the burden has been placed upon the law officer
to assure that all reasonable instructions are given to the court.
This field probably has been the greatest source of trouble for law
officers,, Court -Ilartial Reports are replete with cases which discuss
instructions because they were either not given, or they were erron-
eously given. Due to automatic review and appellate procedures, to-
gether with the critical attitude of the Court of Military Appeals,
the percentage of cases in which a petition for review has been granted
by the latter may appear high. There is no need to review all cases
here j it should suffice to say that the law officer is required to
instruct as fully as a federal judge, probably more so in view of
possible reversal on automatic review.
JUDGE m) DAW OFFICER COMMENTS QN EVIDENCE , Commenting on the
evidence by the judge prior to the jury considering the verdict is
permitted in a federal court. He can generally offer his opinion
regarding 'the facts, the weight of evidence, and the guilt or innocence
of the accused, provided the jury is clearly instructed that they are
the sole triers of the facts;
?
not to do so is reversible error.
308 '
Any opinion he gives must be based on facts. Improper comment by
305 par. 73c, MCM, 1951 . .•..-'.
306 IJheati'ey v . United States. 159 F..2d 599 (:4th. Cir., 1946)
307 Petro v. United States. 210 F,2d 49 (6th Cir», 1954}.-
308 Ouercia v. United States. 289 U. S. 466 (1935)- •
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the judge is not necessarily cured, however, by instructing the jury
309
that they are the only ones to determine the facts. The judge is
310
allowed considerable latitude, • . but his remarks must be carefully
311
guarded and not argumentative. He should, in any comments he
312
makes, state the evidence which is both favorable and unfavorable;
313
and not just the evidence of guilt r ^ He may comment on the weakness
314
of certain evidence offered by the defendant. The judge cannot take
the issue of a fact from the jury," J nor can he instruct them to find
316
a certain fact against the defendant,"' The province of the jury is
not invaded if instructed that the defendant is guilty .if they find
317the facts to be those to which the government witnesses testified.
He may express an opinion of guilt but should do so only when the facts
318
essential to the proof of guilt are undisputed. The judge may,
319
but is not required to, summarize the evidence; he should charge
320
the jury that they should consider all the evidence in the casej he
is not required to comment on every bit of evidence;^ and if re-
quested he should instruct the jury concerning the legal effect of
309 Crie-rrda v. United States. 239 U.S. 466 (1935)
310 (fowling v. United States^ 64 F.2d 796 (6th Cir , 1933)
311 Callanan v. United' States, 223, F„2d 171 (8th Cir., 1955)
312 Byfordv, United~3tates, 185 F,2d 171. QOfchCir., 1950)
313 Spalitto v. United States. 39 F.2d 782 (3th' Cir,, 1930)
314 Marino v. United States. 91 F.2d 691 (9th Cir., 1937)
315 Carothers v c United States, 161 F.2d 718 (5th Cir., 1947)
316 Fleischman v. United, States, 174 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir., 1949) rev.
other gds., 339 U.S. 349
317 Hewitt v. United States . 110 F»2d 1 (D.C. Cir., 1940) cert, den.,
310 tt.S.641
•313 Davis v. United, States, 227 -F.2d 568 (10th Cir.', 1955)
'
319' Williams v. United States, 93 F.2d 685- (9th Cir., 1937)
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den., 337 U.S. 925
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322
certain evidence. He does not pass to the jury issues of fact as
to competency of evidence for their consideration of its admissibility
323
prior to their judging its value.
The military rule governing the law officer's comments and
summarization of the evidence is contained in the Manual and appears
324-
in its text to incorporate the federal decisions as cited above.
The provision states:
"In summarizing or commenting upon the evidence, the law
officer should use the greatest caution to insure that his
remarks do not extend "beyond an accurate, fair, and dis-
passionate statement of what the evidence shows, both in
behalf of the prosecution and the defense. He should not
depart from the role of an impartial judge, or assume
the role of a partisan advocate. He should not assume as
true the existence or nonexistence of a material fact in
issue as to which the evidence is conflicting, as to which
there is dispute, or which is not supported by the evidence,
and he should make it clear that the members of the court
are left free to exercise their independent judgment as
to the facts."
In several cases the U. S, Court of Military Appeals has closely scru-
tinized comments on the evidence by law officers. Instances where
the law officer has characterized procedure as "gobbledygook" when
325
endeavoring to end haggling over leading questions, explained to
the court members that he had determined there to be a prima facie
326
case upon overruling a motion for a finding of not guilty, commented
upon the testimony of the accused that the latter' s description of the
method in which he used a knife amounted to a judicial confession of
327
aggravated assault as a lesser included offense of that charged,
322 Jarabp v. United States, 158 F.2d 509 (1st Cir., 194-6)
323 United States v. Dennis,, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir., 1950)
324 par. ?3c, MCM, 1951
325 United States v. Jackson , 3 USGM 646, 14 CMR 64 (1954-)
326 United States v. Miller . 6 USCMA 4-95, 20 CMR 211 (1955)
327 United States v. Berry, 6 USCMA 638, 20 CMR 354 (1956)
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and in an instruction stated that the accused "may have been intoxi-
328
cated" where there was evidence of drunkenness are examples of
cases reviewed and discussed, but not reversed. In all instances
the reviewing court recognized the discretion of the law officer to
comment on the evidence, provided the court members are clearly in-
formed that they are the sole triers of fact. There can be no dis-
329
tortion, undue emphasis on selected evidence, or additions thereto.
In comparison with the federal judge, the law officer may likewise
coiiment on evidence, but it appears that he may be more limited in
how far he may go because of the U. S. Court of Military Appeals
close watchfulness over the subject.
This concludes a review of powers exercised by the judge and
the law officer during the trial of the issues. The next phase will
be that concerned with powers they exercise after the verdict or the
findings.
323 United States v. Dunnahoe. 6 USCMA 745, 21 CMR 67 (1956)
329 United States v. Miller, 6 USCMA 4-95, 20 CMR 211 (1955)
66
CHAPTER V
COMPARISON CF POST TRIAL POWERS
Moving into the procedural area of those things that transpire
after the verdict in a federal court or after the findings in a court-
martial, further similarity is found. The judge in the federal court
awaits a report from a court representative concerning the defendant
after which he sentences him. In the court-martial, matter in aggra-
vation, extenuation,, or mitigation is heard, together with data of the
accused's previous record, and then the court members assess the sen-
tence. There are two areas in which the judge may act that can be of
interest in the military; polling and a motion for a new trial.
f
m
OULSSpu. A jury may be polled in the federal courts. Under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rale 31(d) restates the previous
330
existing law ( The judge determines the manner in which the jury
33"1
may be polled and may hear the statements of jurors that the ver-
dict as announced in court is not the same as the one upon which the
33?jury decided. However, the verdict of the jury cannot be impeached
so as to show that it was gained in a particular manner, except to
333
reveal corruption or outside influence. *f appropriate, a new trial
may be grant si in the discretion of the trial judge,
335
Felling the court is uivaiown to mrlitsiry law* The cited case
states that the court acts as a unit and its decision is that of the
330 Jjgdjgr^^Qd^^finjaoiatg.d, Note of Advisory Committee, Rule 31
331 Shockley v. United States. 3.66 F.2d 704- (9th Cir., 194-8) cert, den.,
334 U.S. 850
332 Young v. United .States, 163 F.2d 187 (10th Car., 194-7) cert. den.,
332 U.sT 770
333 Ibid .
334 United States v. F^inberg, 14-0 F.2d 592 (2d Cir., 1944) cert,
den., 332, U.S. 726
335 ACM 6751, Tolbert. 14 CMR 613
67
unit rather than the individual members. It is believed that there
is a more fundamental reason. In a jury trial, the jury votes to con-
vict or acquit the defendant; in either event, the decision of the
jury is unanimous. Provision is made for hung juries, if the jurors
cannot agree. In a court-martial at least a two-thirds secret majority
336
is needed to convict an accused j only in the situation './here the
337
death sentence is mandatory is unanimous concurrence required.
As a result, the hung jury concept does not exist in the military.
But, instead, there is sometimes the problem of senior officers
influencing juniors on the court-martial. If the junior knew that
he might be required to disclose his vote when the court was polled,
he would be more reluctant to cast an independent and uninfluenced
vote. This type of improper influence does not exist in the jury
room, although personal influence or persuasion is usually present.
Be2au.se of this possibility of seniority influence, the secrecy of the
military ballot must be maintained. Two slight exceptions, if carefully
and properly administered, may be possible. The first deviation may
arise if the defense, upon conviction, desires to inquire from other
court members, and particularly the junior member since he counts the
votes, if the announced finding coincides with that as decided by
the court. This, of course, does not amount to a polling of the
individual members as to how they voted, /mother slight deviation
might be allowable where there can be shown that the members of the
court were influenced by outside interests. Otherwise, the vote of
336 Art. 52(a)(2), UCMJ
337 Art. 52(a)(1), UCMJ
33S par. 74d(2), MGM, 1951
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the individual court member? should not be divulged,
..NEW TRIAL. ., A new trial is a term employed by the federal courts
and the military, but each have given it different meanings. In the
appellate channels of the federal courts, the defendant may appeal to
a circuit court of appeals or to the Supreme Court. Such an appeal is
at his own expense. In contrast, the military offender may submit a
brief for consideration by the convening authority when the latter
339takes his action on the record of trial j &* certain instances the
34.0
case is considered by a board of reviewj and thereafter he may
petition the U. S. Court of Military Appeals for a review (mandatory
in the case of a death sentence or in the case of a general officer).
All of this review may be without expense to the accused unless he
elects to retain civilian counsel.
Because of the military appellate procedure, the term rehear-
ing is used where directing a retrial of the case due to error committed
at the original trial level. Consequently the term "new trial" in
the military has been reserved for the limited statutory grounds of
newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court whenever the sentence
extends to severance from the service, death, or confinement for more
than a year.-**2
In the federal courts, a new trial is requested by motion before
the trial judge. In the interest of justice, it is within his discre-
tion whether or not to grant the motion. Based, upon newly discovered
• • — «r* *— —» a» *• •» mm *• • —• — mm •" mm mm mm •— mm- mm mm mm mm mm mm mm mm mm mm « mm mm, mm mm mmmm
339 par. 43j(2), MGM, 1951
340 Art. 66, UCMJ
341 Art. 67, UCMJ
342 Art. 73, UCMJ , . ',
,.
343 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 33
69
evidence, the defendant has within two years to file the motion; in
all other cases, the motion must be filed within 5 days of the verdict
or within such additional time as the judge may grant within the 5-
344day period, A motion for a new trial predicated upon the evidence
345
rests within the discretion of the trial judge, ^ and it must have been
3/6
preceded by a motion for acquittal. ' Although discovery of new
evidence is specifically made a ground for a new trial by the Rules,
its being granted is discretionary, reviewable only where prejudicially
34-7
abused. Ordinarily a new trial based upon newly discovered evi-
dence will not be granted if the outcome of the new trial would not
present a different result. The disqualification of a juror usually
34-9
is not enough j however, the misconduct of a juror may be sufficient
350depending upon the discretion of the court. Denial of a fair trial
seems to be the test.
The military system has no counterpart and there do not appear
to be any decisions where the law officer endeavored to foilow the
federal procedure. The reason for the lack of authority on this point
is probably due to the IJanual provision for filing a brief and the pre-
viously mentioned review channels without any expense. However, the
344- Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 33
34-5 Applebaum v. United, States , 274 Fed. 43 (7th Gir.,1921) cert,
den., 256 U.S. 704
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U. S. Court of Military Appeals has held that a trial does not end un-
til the sentencing procedure has been completed, and that the lav;
officer continues to rule on interlocutory questions until the trial
35I
ends. Thus it may appear that the law officer can continue to
act during the presentencing and sentencing procedure, but that his
power wanes rapidly after the court has adjudged a sentence. This
conclusion is reached, not because of the Code, but because the Manual
does not specifically provide the court nay exercise further power
and because of the appellate avenue available. Therefore, in cases
where the trial judge in the federal court normally grants a new trial,
the military offender obtains similar relief by setting forth his
reasons in an application to the reviewing authority for a rehearing.
By \tfhatever name it is called, the offender may receive another trial
in either system.
May not a lav;' officer at some future time be faced with a mo-
tion for a new trial? It is believed very possible; defense counsel
would lose nothing by trying to interpose this motion and might well
succeed if adequate grounds exist. Such a motion ought to be predi-
352 353
cated upon Rule 33 rather than Article 73, since the latter
is so restrictive on the grounds for which a new trial nay be granted
and must be made through a petition to the Judge Advocate General.
A motion for a new trial would probably be received during the
presentencing phase of the trial or even after the sentence has been
announced, but before adjournment. Because of the lav; officer's loss
351 United States v. Strand, 6 U3CMA 297, 20 CMR 13 (1955)
352 Federal T.ules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 33
353 Art. 73, UCliJ
71
of power after the adjournment and the lack of authority for a court
to reconvene unless so directed by the convening authority., there is
little likelihood that an accused would be able to make a motion for
a new trial at that late date. However, there easily could be a Manual
change so as to specifically allow for a law officer hearing a motion
for a new trial after the court has adjourned as a federal judge does
sifter the jury has been discharged, .And for administrative as well
as legal purposes, it might be considered a better procedural method
than the present system of using affidavits to show the grounds for
a rehearing when not already contained in the record of trial.
• If the law officer were to receive a motion for a new trial
during the presentencing part of the trial, what should be his action?
For instance, assume that it is based upon the fact that someone
overheard the trial counsel discussing the case with a court member
while the court was considering the findings. Defense counsel could
immediately ask that the court be reopened and move for either the
disqualification of the member or move for a mistrial. Counsel would
be unwise in following this method, because, particularly in a close
case, he ought to hear the findings of the court first; after all, it
might be that the accused would be acquitted, or the findings of guilty
so reduced in degree of severity that the accused would benefit by not
publicizing the misconduct of the court member. However, assuming the
findings to be adverse, the defense might then move for a new trial
under Rule 33?^^'
354- Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 33
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The law officer should not then state that he does not have the
power to grant a new trial. If he does, and it is ultimately determined
he has the power, a rehearing probably would be required. His
better procedure would be to hear evidence on the motion and then rule
upon it. If he denies the motion, even though it is subsequently
determined that he does not have such a power, no error has been com-
mitted because his ruling would have no effect. If he denies the
motion with poorer to do so, his ruling probably would only be review-
able in the event he abused his discretion as is the rule in federal
courts j if the discretion were abused, a rehearing would be necessary
anyway because of the error.
If he decides to grant the motion for a new trial, the law
officer will be, of course, acting without a precedent, But actually
a motion for a new trial, because of the grounds upon which it may be
predicated, is similar to a mistrial in certain respects; in others
it is related to a motion for a finding of not guilty. Since the latter
355 356
is sanctioned by statute ' and the former by court decision, there
exists a strong implication that the lav; officer has authority to
3r7
grant a new trial under Rule 33 • ' .Any argument that he is without
authority to assign the case to a new court for trial is without merit,
for he is in the same position when he declares a mistrial.
Any request to the law officer or president of the court after
adjournment that the court reconvene for the purpose of hearing a
355 Art. 51, UGMJ
356 United; States v. Stringer, " 5 USCllA' 122', 17* GMR " 122 ' (1954.)
357 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 33
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motion for a new trial probably does not present much of a problem,
358
particularly after the five-day period specified in Rule 33. ' As
previously stated, it may be administratively advisable for a con-
vening authority to make provision for this procedure rather than
depend upon affidavits. If such a method were used, there would be
no need for the presence of the court member sj their absence would be
similar to that discussed previously in connection with hearings before
trial regarding motions. But in view of appellate procedures, it
probably is not wise for this practice to be adopted without Manual
sanction.





A federal judge had broad powers during a criminal trial as
compared with those of a lav/ officer when the Uniform Code of Military
Justice came into being. The disparity between the two has been
narrowed tremendously by the U. S. Court of Military Appeals; however,
its decisions in some instances have utilized language and terminology
casting doubt as to the status of the law in several areas. Had the
Court been more specific or definitive in its opinions, many of the
existing problems would not be unsolved; had the Court set forth the
law to be followed in a particular field rather than decide limited
issues with broad implications, undecided facets would not be pre-
valent ,
There are quite a number of areas which a law officer may yet
explore. Bringing them to the fore may require time due to law officers
not being aggressive; if one is over-zealous without the sanction of
his superiors, he will be subject to criticism. To gain progress, a
staff judge advocate or legal officer must convince his convening
authority that the law officer of their general court-martial must be
allowed to use his own judgment in proceeding under the federal rules
and decisions.
Experimentation should only be done by a lav; officer in those
cases where the number of expected witnesses is feu, so that there
will be a minimum of inconvenience if a rehearing is required. The
usual trial for absence may be the proper place. As long as all the
rights which are guaranteed by either the Constitution, the Code, or
75
the Manual are protected, the accused should have little cause to com-
plain, especially when folloi;ing rules which govern his counterpart
in the federal district court. There now follows a recapitulation of
those discussed areas where. a law officer may have latent or different
powers vrtiich could permit his acting otherwise than he has in the past.
Initially the law officer has almost no power before the court
convenes in a particular case because of its being of such limited
and special jurisdiction; but after its first meeting, he controls
the trial except for a few minor duties of the president. As for the
first meeting of the court, there has been suggested that general courts-
martial proceed similarly to federal courts at the outset by use of
the federal pretrial hearing. This pretrial should not be confused
with the military pretrial investigation which is conducted before
the case is referred to trial. Preliminary court work may then be
accomplished without the presence of the court members. The plan
would be subject to defeat only if counsel or the lav; officer were
challenged for cause so as to raise a factual issue for the court mem-
bers to decide. Otherwise, the pretrial might proceed through the
arraignment, hearing of motions, and the pleas. There would be need-
ed a change as to who would administer oaths to counsel, but that de-
viates only from the Manual and not the Code. Although not so useful
in those commands ordering general courts-martial rather infre-
quently, it would materially aid those with a large volume of trials.
For instance, Mondays could be reserved to hear pretrials of those
cases expected to reach trial during the week, or to ask for special
relief such as a continuance. Possibly the entire day might be
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consumed with these pretrials. Thus, at least five, and usually more,
man-days would be saved through the absence of the court members. If
they served any useful purpose during this part of the trial, the
present system would be preferable; but they don't. In doubt, of
course, is the legality of so proceeding without lianual authorization
and in view of the present trial guide set forth therein. To be noted,
however, is the fact that the Iianual procedure is termed a guide.
Since the power of the law officer is quite similar to that of
a federal judge in many areas, there is no need to review them in
detail c In general, they relate to motions for discovery, severance,
a bill of particulars, a continuance, and a mistrial, as well as the
ordering the taking of depositions, the issuance of a subpoena, the
treatment of witnesses, and comments regarding the evidence.
In doubt is the exact role which law officers play in respect
to motions raising defenses and objections to trial. ' fliere only a
question of law is raised on uncontroverted facts, there is no pro-
blem, because the law officer may rule finally without submitting any
portion of the controversy to the court. But where factual issues
are involved, the area becomes cloudy. Certainly, where there is a
fact in issue which goes to the guilt or innocence of the accused, he
is entitled to have that fact considered b3r the court; and the law
officer cannot deprive him of this right by ruling on the motion. .Al-
though he may make his ruling, he must also submit the factual issue
to the court for its determination. * Going further, certain defenses
may have factual issues to be decided which affect the defense but do
not touch upon guilt or innocence. In other words, the fact .may bear
77
on a bar to trial rather than guilt or innocence of the offense. It
is here concluded it is immaterial which one of the two is affected,
and the same rule applies to both. Until the lav; is more settled, it
will be well for lav; officers to consider the rule so applying. Even
though it is a detraction from his powers, submitting the contested
facts to the court for its determination will be safer.
The law-officer may have the power to order the search and
seizure of property within the confines of a military installation.
If so ordered by him during the course of a trial, it probably would
not be illegal j however, administratively it would be more practical
to refer the request to the convening authority.
Suppression of evidence has not been directed heretofore by law
officers, probably because of the Manual provision against it. However,
there is authority for this type of a motion in the federal courts.
The mere fact that there is opportunity for objection to illegally
seized property when offered in evidence, the reason stated in the
Manual as to why the motion is not allowed, appears weak in logic,
because there also exists the same opportunity to object during the
trial in a federal court. If the federal pretrial system were to be
adopted, there would be all the more reason for allowing this motion
to be made, Danger lies in the law officer stating he is powerless
to hear the motion because of the Manual ; he is in a better position
if he rules upon it, even though the only action he takes is to defer
his ruling until the trial. It could not then be said on review that
he failed to exercise a power which he possessed notwithstanding the
Manual provision; and the accused could not complain on review if the
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law officer rules on the notion to suppress because the procedure had
been followed at his request.
As the federal judge must do, the law officer is required to
see that the accused has a fair trial. It must be a public one with
a few minor exceptions. Even closing the trial while hearing evidence
classified for security purposes may become subject to criticism.
The law officer's ruling on chellenges prior to arraignment
remains in doubt. It is believed that the law officer may be able to
excuse from sitting anyone who clearly should not be connected with
the trial. In this respect he would not be ruling upon the challenge,
but would be excusing the person for cause due to being disqualified.
Tf there is, of course, a factual issue to be determined, the matter
should be allowed to go to the court for its decision. After arraign-
ment, it has been held harmless error for the law officer to excuse
a member for cause subject to the objection of the court. In view
of the harmless error involved, law officers possibly should be fore-
handed by using this device to preclude an erroneous ruling by the
court on a challenge.
As for the law officer disqualifying himself as a federal judge
may, there is no military precedent. He may disclose the grounds in
general terms and hope to be challenged successfully; but there does
not seem to be any reason why he could not disqualify himself like
the federal judge,
Changing venue under a motion for appropriate relief may pos-
sibly be a power which the lav/ officer could exercise. Similarly to a
mistrial where he is not able to refer the case to another court, in
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a change of venue the law officer is not able to refer the case to
another jurisdiction. Action on such a motion would have to be
correlated by the law officer's convening authority with another con-
vening authority. From a practical viewpoint, the lav/ officer could
grant an extended continuance to allow opportunity for the antagonis-
tic sentiment to subside. It would also give opportunity for a further
consideration by the convening authority of changing the place of trial.
In regard to contempts, the law officer may have greater power
than outlined in the lianual, Except for the latter, it would appear
that he should have the power to hold an individual in contempt with-
out referring the issue to the court members, since it is an inter-
locutory question. However, without a change to the Manual, the lega-
lity of a law officer's determination of a contempt may be dubious.
Polling the court members is rightly prohibited. But there may
be a place for the law officer permitting an inquiry of other members
as to whether or not the announced finding represented the true
vote of the court. In connection with the findings, the lav/ officer
should permit inquiry as to undue influence by other court members or
by outside interests, particularly when such inquiry is based upon
reliable information.
A motion for a new trial or rehearing is one which has not been
considered by reviewing authorities.. Its use could develop into a
helpful vehicle for considering matter becoming known after the find-
ings, which presently requires the filing of affidavits to support a
rehearing. If a method akin to that prescribed by the federal procedure
were used, the lav/ officer's power could thus be extended beyond the
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adj ournment of the court to process such a motion. Courts-martial
would then more approximate federal procedure in this respect.
Finally, there are a few additional observations which have
resulted from this study. Firstly, it is believed that all officers
engaged in military justice should study the Federal Rules of Criminal
Frocedure for a better understanding of some Code provisions and more
particularly the Manual provisions. Lav; officers certainly should
be acquainted with the Rules so as to preclude their being surprised by mo-
tions unfamiliar inthe military but recognized in the district courts.
Secondly, every lav/ officer shou.ld be equipped with a copy of Title 18,
U. S. Code .Annotated containing the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure and a good text on the same subject. Volumes 11 and 12,
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure (3d Edition) published by Callaghan
and Company, for instance, was used extensively in this study. Third
and lastly, the U. S. Court of Military Appeals, from appearance at
least, tends to scrutinize the conduct of lav/ officers and may import
misconduct without knowing all the facts j such a determination does not
necessarily serve the ends of justice. To obtain the latter, both
the accused and the government should receive a fair trial. Lav;
officers can materially raise their prestige in the eyes of the U. S,
Court of Military Appeals. By doing so, the Court in time s.-ould re-
cognize that the lav; officer merely exercised his discretion as would
a judge under similar circumstances and under the factual situation
known to him at the time. Consequently, there should result greater















The law officer as a trial
judge.

